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Title VII Hasn’t Changed; We Have

by Lindsay Hesketh

One day after the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday in 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 141731 (E.O. 14173), taking direct aim at Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).2 E.O. 14173 claimed “critical and influential institutions of American society,” including public and private employers, have been using race- and sex-based preferences in violation of Title VII.3 The Executive Order directed federal agencies to develop strategies to combat “illegal DEI,” pursue potential litigation against private industry, and identify a list of large companies to investigate for compliance.4 E.O. 14173 didn’t amend the law, yet it incited a call to immediate corporate action.

More than 200 S&P 500 companies diluted their DEI5 messaging during the first half of 2025.6 The public relations statements became predictable. Citigroup removed its “aspirational representation goals” and other explicit practices to diversify its candidate pools after “recent changes in U.S. federal government policy.”7 Bank of America claimed it adjusted its practices “‘in light of new laws, court decisions, and more recently, executive orders from the new administration.’”8 BlackRock committed to adapting “as the law changes.”9

This short essay argues that the federal law cannot be blamed for substantive changes to employer DEI practices in response to E.O. 14173 and offers recommendations for a new approach. Since enacted, Title VII’s core anti-discrimination protections have stayed relatively stagnant. By contrast, companies have gradually molded their DEI efforts under the influence of popular social opinion. Companies announced commitments to ensuring women and members of historically underrepresented racial groups were considered more intentionally for leadership roles and praised themselves for increasing representation of these same groups among their ranks.10 These actions left companies vulnerable to future enforcement challenges, such as the agenda of this Administration. Thus, the message from E.O. 14173 should not come as a surprise to employers.

E.O. 14173 does not mark the end of DEI. Employers can still achieve the DEI outcomes they once wanted (and presumably still want). Companies do not need to change the what—diversity, equity, and inclusion; they need to change how they do it.

Part I discusses the beginning of Title VII and its application to corporate DEI initiatives. Part II discusses how DEI and Title VII interpretations have fared after E.O. 14173. Part III concludes with suggestions on how DEI initiatives could transform to accomplish their intended effects under existing law.

I. How It Started

Title VII and large-scale corporate adoption of DEI didn’t happen overnight. Pushing Title VII to fruition took years of persistence, persuasion, and sacrifice among those fighting for equal opportunities. Enacting a law prohibiting employers from making employment decisions based on a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin11 theoretically threatened the jobs and exclusivity enjoyed by those who already had opportunities to work, earn income, and build their legacies.

Once passed, the work to attain equal employment opportunities would take more from employers than abiding by the plain letter of the law. Employers had to find ways to address historical inequalities that threatened to maintain the status quo of a homogenous workforce. These efforts to create a more integrated workforce were the early stages of what would eventually become known as DEI.12

A. Title VII

On its face and in the context of this generation, Title VII’s underlying principles may seem uncontroversial—even desirable. That wasn’t the sentiment 80 years ago. Like the creation of our country, equal employment opportunities were initially brought into lawful existence through force.

In 1941, the United States boomed with defense production jobs in response to World War II.13 Citizens of the Black community were eager to serve their country through labor.14 Some believed that backing the country’s war efforts would demonstrate Black Americans were as worthy of citizenship as their White counterparts.15 But the defense industry needed convincing.16

When efforts to join the defense market were met with resistance and discrimination, civil rights leaders demanded support from the White House to give Black workers access to jobs.17 A. Philip Randolph and a coalition of other Black leaders warned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that, if he denied their request, 100,000 Black citizens would march on the White House in protest of discrimination.18 Fearing the escalation that could follow, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941.19

Executive Order 8802 claimed to “reaffirm” the country’s anti-discrimination policy and directed defense contractors and government agencies to train and hire workers without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.20 Though limited in its application to private employers, Executive Order 8802 became a starting point for anti-discrimination protection in employment.21

More than 20 years later, legislators introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22 The Act culminated decades of tireless civil rights advocacy against a backdrop of dissonance, death, and ongoing discrimination.23 Before enactment, legislators slaughtered the House bill with strikethrough amendments and used filibustering as an unsuccessful submission tactic.24 Only after its tortuous journey inside and outside the halls of Congress, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.25 The final Act included the mandate under Title VII prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.26

B. DEI in Private Employment

Title VII tasked companies with shifting their workplace cultures under an untested legal mandate. Some private employers took measures to find novel paths to a diversified workforce, facing backlash and lawsuits in response. But their creativity and the litigation that ensued would provide clarity for other employers facing similar challenges.

In the 1970s, the Supreme Court gifted employers with a DEI framework. The Court’s opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke debuted in 1978,27 followed by United Steelworkers of America v. Weber in 1979.28 Even though Bakke addressed Title VI, which prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs like higher education,29 rather than Title VII, both decisions continued to influence corporate DEI practices into the next century.

Allan Bakke was a white male who failed to gain admission to medical school in 1973 and 1974 despite having a strong application.30 He claimed his fate was, in part, a result of the school’s special admissions program, which reserved select seats for applicants who identified as economically or educationally disadvantaged, both alleged euphemisms for race.31 The school screened applicants in the special admissions pool competitively against one another but not against the general admissions pool, which is where Bakke had been placed.32 The Supreme Court concluded that race could not be a deciding factor in admissions but could potentially serve as a “‘plus’” factor.33

The next year, the Supreme Court penned its decision in Weber. Brian Weber, the respondent, worked at Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) in Gramercy, Louisiana.34 In 1974, Kaiser and the United Steelworkers of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which included a training program and racial quotas intended to integrate qualified Black craft workers into Kaiser plants.35 Previously, Kaiser hired craft workers only if they had prior craft experience, and keeping that prerequisite would have perpetuated Kaiser’s predominantly White workforce given the prior exclusion of the Black community from craft unions.36

The CBA required plants to increase the number of Black craft workers equal to the percentage of Black workers in the local labor forces.37 The training program would help plants reach those goals by reserving at least 50% of the training program spots for Black candidates.38 Kaiser’s inaugural class included seven Black production workers and six White production workers, which resulted in the rejection of certain White applicants with more seniority.39 Weber was one such worker.40

Weber claimed Kaiser’s plan violated section 703 of Title VII.41 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Title VII did not prohibit all “private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans.”42 Even though the Court declined to explain specific parameters for lawful and unlawful plans, it underscored that Kaiser’s plan was designed to “break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” without “unnecessarily trammel[ing] the interests of the white employees.”43 Significantly, the Court highlighted that the program was “temporary” and “not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.”44

Taken together, Bakke and Weber signaled two significant principles for DEI efforts. First, characteristics protected under Title VII could not serve as deciding factors but could be part of a broader analysis in selection processes.45 Second, private employers’ voluntary affirmative action plans may be lawful if they serve as temporary measures to eliminate a documented historical imbalance without “trammel[ing]” the rights of others.46 Though sparse, employers relied on this guidance for decades.

II. How It’s Going

As expected, workplace culture and expectations progressed after the 1970s. Some scholars note that corporate DEI morphed from solving for segregation into a strategic vision for workplace culture to mirror the modern workforce and desired customer base.47 DEI became a “‘less contentious’ alternative to solving the problem of demographic changes rather than addressing injustices of the past.”48

From one viewpoint, we could applaud private employers’ recent DEI decisions prior to 2025. Employers spoke up about diversifying their teams, often mentioning women and racial minorities.49 With rising social support, employers published diversity statistics and “aspirational” goals,50 perhaps hoping to pioneer further changes in common law.

But as DEI initiatives advanced, the law did not. While Title VII underwent other growing pains, none of its amendments would codify voluntary affirmative action plans or the use of protected characteristics as a “plus” factor.51 Neither the Federal Legislature nor Supreme Court condoned implementing indefinite voluntary affirmative action plans in private employment or allowing companies to mirror the makeup of the labor force moving forward.52

Despite the basic tenets of Title VII remaining unchanged, employer DEI rhetoric strongly suggested using characteristics protected by Title VII as motivating factors in employment decisions. Prior to 2024, the year of the last presidential election, large employers touted “aspirational diversity goals” and their internal DEI efforts.53 These words alone were not inconsistent with Title VII, but the “goals” became more legally questionable once defined.

For example, Citigroup explained it had “aspirational representation goals to increase women leadership globally and Black leadership in the United States at the firm by the end of 2021.”54 After 2021, Citigroup stated it broadened its workforce diversity goals but continued to focus on increasing the representation of women and Black employees among firm leadership.55

In Bank of America’s 2024 proxy statement, the company boasted that its Global Diversity & Inclusion Council had been established more than 20 years earlier to help promote its own “aspirational diversity goals.”56 One page later, the bank reported it had made “improvement in the diversity of [its] leadership, management, and global workforce,” defining “diverse” as “women and people of color.”57 Finally, BlackRock’s proxy report for its 2023 performance described its “aspirational workforce diversity goals” as being specific to “senior women, overall Black, and overall Latinx representation.”58

The focus on sex, race, and color in these public DEI statements does not mean any company was violating Title VII. The statements do, however, raise questions of compliance. Perhaps companies like the ones above were leaning on Bakke, as augmented in 2003 by Grutter v. Bollinger,59 and Weber as plausible support. This was precisely the problem.

In 2023, the Supreme Court decided Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (SFFA) and pointed out a well-known secret: Bakke is outdated.60 Chief Justice Roberts revived the idea that “at some point” using race as a plus factor “must end.”61 SFFA examines college admissions, but employers wondered if this foreshadowed more change to come. It did.

Executive Order 14173 prohibits “illegal DEI.”62 It does not amend Title VII or purport to offer a new interpretation of existing law.63 The Order parrots the law in its opening remarks by noting, “Longstanding Federal civil-rights laws protect individual Americans from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”64 President Trump declares he has “a solemn duty” to enforce “these laws.”65 In other words, the Administration seeks to enforce Title VII as it stands now. There is nothing unprecedented about E.O. 14173’s recitation of the law. It states the obvious: illegal activities under Title VII are, in fact, unlawful.

Despite its uninspired reasoning, E.O. 14173 warned private employers that creative liberties taken under Title VII would no longer be tolerated.66 Section 1 claimed that United States businesses have undermined Title VII protections by using “immoral race- and sex-based preferences under the guise of so-called ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion.’”67 As part of its agenda, E.O. 14173 signaled the government’s intention to take aim at enforcement against private employers.68 Section 4 of the Order instructed the Attorney General of the United States to prepare a report with a proposed enforcement strategy to “end illegal [DEI] discrimination,” including by having each federal agency identify up to nine proposed civil compliance investigations into public corporations, large non-profits, and other industries.69

Bolstering E.O. 14173’s message, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued complementary technical guidance on March 19, 2025.70 Its explanation of the law is not groundbreaking but specifically points out that Title VII applies “equally to all workers” and not only “racial or ethnic minorities, workers with non-American national origins, ‘diverse’ employees, or ‘historically under-represented groups.’”71 The EEOC addressed popular corporate DEI speech, proclaiming that “client or customer preference is not a defense to race or color discrimination.”72 To eliminate any lingering doubt, the EEOC states, “No general business interests in diversity and equity (including perceived operational benefits or customer/client preference) have ever been found by the Supreme Court or the EEOC to be sufficient to allow race-motivated employment actions.”73

Since E.O. 14173 premiered, the EEOC’s follow-through has been mild. The EEOC had a light year in lawsuits during its fiscal year 2025. In particular, it filed only three Title VII lawsuits asserting race or national origin discrimination in fiscal year 2025 compared to filing 14 in fiscal year 2024, filing 27 in fiscal year 2023, and filing 17 in fiscal year 2022.74 Two of the three lawsuits in 2025 were on the basis of “reverse” discrimination.75

It may be that the EEOC is only warming up. On December 17, 2025, EEOC Commissioner Andrea Lucas posted a solicitation for White men to file EEOC charges if aggrieved.76 If White men answer that call, the charges may propel a spike in EEOC lawsuits and employers will need to respond. Even so, the same logic applies: the law has not changed. Employers do not need to drench their workforce demographics with White men to avoid EEOC suspicion and, contrary to the actions of major U.S. companies, DEI programming is not per se unlawful. Corporate DEI simply needs refreshing.

III. Where It’s Going

Supporters and opponents of E.O. 14173 can likely agree on one thing: they want equal opportunities in employment. No one is asking for a handout. Employees want to be valued on their merits. Common law dating back to the 1970s through present supports these same ideals.

Weber promoted equity by giving a previously oppressed group a fair chance at integration. Bakke acknowledged the significance of considering underrepresentation as one factor in the admissions process when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was relatively new, and SFFA has attempted to bring the Bakke analysis into contemporary times. Last year, the Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services decision clarified that the same evidentiary burden applies to all plaintiffs alleging violations of Title VII regardless of whether they are members of a minority or majority group.77

There’s an argument that efforts to diversify must be intentional to be successful.78 Assuming its accuracy, companies don’t need a “plus” factor through the explicit use of race, sex, color, national origin, or religion to be intentional. They should focus on the source of the inequities they intend to counter and go beyond the surface characteristics listed in Title VII. DEI efforts are often about giving access to members of underrepresented groups where they may have been previously overlooked or excluded. Employers can create that access through other considerations.

For example, pipeline programs seek to offer training and mentorship support to candidates who may not have opportunities to build the right skills or find organic mentorship from personal contacts.79 That means the pipeline program doesn’t need to focus on race or sex, it can focus on “first” or similar criteria.80 “First” may mean first-in family to work toward an executive position or to work a corporate job at a Fortune 500 company, or it may mean first- or second-generation college students, graduate students, or related standards.

If a company seeks to mirror its customer base81 or a specific market share, reconsider what “qualified” means. Instead of screening for a 4.0 GPA from an Ivy League institution, qualified may mean an applicant who graduated from a community college in the geographic region of the customer base. If a company seeks ambitious applicants, qualified may mean someone who worked multiple jobs while completing their education or a candidate who earned their degree while incarcerated. And so on.

Executive Order 14173 is meant to address “the importance of individual merit, aptitude, hard work, and determination when selecting people for jobs and services in key sectors of American society[.]”82 Companies can emphasize these attributes and diversify their workforces by changing their perspectives on how candidates demonstrate their aptitude, hard work, and determination. Stop using legacies, private school degrees, and nepotism as key indicators. Stop looking at “how people were born instead of what they [are] capable of doing.”83 Instead, consider community involvement, graduating from a school with high attrition, or domestic geographic origins.

DEI does not have to disappear, but the corporate approach must modernize. This Administration and the Supreme Court have made clear that Title VII will be enforced as written. Protected characteristics under Title VII cannot be “plus” factors when making employment decisions. Like the pivot points after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the opinions in Bakke (1978) and Weber (1979), it’s time for another change. SFFA and E.O. 14173 provide a new roadmap to bring DEI into this generation.

While many core legal principles have not changed, we have. DEI doesn’t, and shouldn’t, look like it did in 1979, 2003, or even 2020. If corporate America supports DEI as it once claimed, this is its opportunity to evolve rather than retreat. There is no shame in companies rebranding DEI to remove a target from their backs, but there is no need to abandon DEI. Of course, if private employers want to eliminate DEI efforts, they can. But it’s not because the law changed. It’s because they did.

Footnotes

  1. 1. Exec. Order No. 14173, 90 Fed. Reg. 8633 (Jan. 31, 2025). ↩
  2. 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. ↩
  3. 3. Exec. Order, supra note 1. ↩
  4. 4. Id. ↩
  5. 5. This essay refers to diversity, equity, and inclusion using the acronym “DEI” to align with E.O. 14173 and common terms used in corporate policies, but it is worth mentioning that the term omits an essential ingredient to present-day DEI initiatives: belonging. See Neelie Verlinden, Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Belonging At Work: A 2026 Guide, Academy to Innovate HR, https://www.aihr.com/blog/diversity-equity-inclusion-belonging-deib/ [https://perma.cc/Q5MC-MWEZ] (last visited Jan. 5, 2026). Relatedly, this essay does not address Executive Order 14168, which had other implications for Title VII and directives more specific than general DEI efforts discussed here. See Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615 (Jan. 30, 2025). ↩
  6. 6. Freshfields, Trends and Updates from the 2025 Proxy Season 62 (June 16, 2025), https://www.freshfields.com/globalassets/noindex/documents/trends-and-updates-from-the-2025-proxy-season-june-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LS2-VS5B]. ↩
  7. 7. Jane Fraser, Colleague Engagement Update, Citigroup (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.citigroup.com/global/news/perspective/2025/022025-jane-fraser-statement (last visited Jan. 10, 2026). ↩
  8. 8. Jessica Guynn, These are the companies that rolled back DEI amid Trump backlash, USA Today (Dec. 9, 2025, at 5:04 ET) https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2025/12/09/trump-dei-rollback-list-backlash/87457060007/ [https://perma.cc/CHD2-FVQ2]. ↩
  9. 9. Id. ↩
  10. 10. See, e.g., Bank of America, 2024 Proxy Statement, 9–10 (March 11, 2024), https://d1io3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_549ae580990f5bb98d4a922efd8862d5/bankofamerica/db/867/10038/proxy_statement/2_Bank+of+America+2024+Proxy+Statement_ADA.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N7B-XASG] (explaining its process of creating a diverse slate of candidates for board positions and considering “diverse characteristics” such as race, among others); BlackRock, 2024 Annual Proxy Statement, 3 (May 15, 2024), https://s24.q4cdn.com/856567660/files/doc_financials/2024/ar/2024-Proxy-Statement_vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z57A-PJE6] (stating its commitment to board diversity and specifically noting the number of women and “racially/ethnically diverse” directors); Citigroup, Inc., 2024 Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, 10, 14 (April 30, 2024), https://www.citigroup.com/rcs/citigpa/storage/public/Citi-2024-proxy-statement.pdf (discussing commitment to women and minority group representation among its board directors and other leaders). ↩
  11. 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(d). ↩
  12. 12. See Jennifer Bay & Josephine Walwema, A History of DEI: How Regulatory and Compliance Rhetorics Influence Organizations, 34 Tech. Commc’n Q. 405, 411 (2025) (explaining “[o]rganizational attempts to comply with laws” like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “helped produce what is known today as DEI”). ↩
  13. 13. Sidney Milkis & Katherine Rader, The March on Washington Movement, the Fair Employment Practices Committee, and the Long Quest for Racial Justice, 38 Stud. in Am. Pol. Dev. 16, 20–21 (2024). ↩
  14. 14. See id. at 21. ↩
  15. 15. Id. ↩
  16. 16. Id. ↩
  17. 17. See id. at 16, 21. ↩
  18. 18. See id.; Kevin M. Schultz, The FEPC and the Legacy of the Labor-Based Civil Rights Movement of the 1940s, 49 Lab. Hist. 71, 74 (2008). ↩
  19. 19. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 27, 1941). ↩
  20. 20. Id. ↩
  21. 21. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, The Early Years, History of the EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/history/early-years [https://perma.cc/JEP2-2MYW] (last visited April 5, 2026) (explaining Executive Order 8802 was “the first presidential action ever taken to prevent employment discrimination by private employers holding government contracts”). ↩
  22. 22. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. Rev. 431, 433–35 (1966). ↩
  23. 23. See EEOC, supra note 21 (summarizing historical events between the inception of Executive Order 8802 and the Baptist church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama in September 1963). ↩
  24. 24. Vaas, supra note 22, at 434–57. ↩
  25. 25. Id. at 457. ↩
  26. 26. See id. at 433, 439, 457; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(d). ↩
  27. 27. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). ↩
  28. 28. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). ↩
  29. 29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–d-7. ↩
  30. 30. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. ↩
  31. 31. Id. at 272-274. ↩
  32. 32. Id. at 275. ↩
  33. 33. Id. at 319-320. ↩
  34. 34. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199. ↩
  35. 35. Id. at 197-198. ↩
  36. 36. Id. at 198. ↩
  37. 37. Id. ↩
  38. 38. Id. ↩
  39. 39. Id. at 199. ↩
  40. 40. Id. ↩
  41. 41. Id. at 199-200. ↩
  42. 42. Id. at 208. ↩
  43. 43. Id. ↩
  44. 44. Id. ↩
  45. 45. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20. ↩
  46. 46. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. ↩
  47. 47. See Bay & Walwema, supra note 12, at 414-415. ↩
  48. 48. Id. 415. ↩
  49. 49. See Seth Matlins, Jabari Young, & Ali Jackson-Jolley, Forbes’ 2023 Progress Report: Where 11 of America’s Top Companies Stand on Diversity and Equity Goals, Forbes (June 5, 2024 12:29 PM ET), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sethmatlins/2023/06/19/forbes-2023-progress-report-where-11-of-americas-top-companies-stand-on-diversity-and-equity-goals/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2026) (reporting survey results on programs designed to increase racial and ethnic diversity among employees, board members, and suppliers); Dame Vivian Hunt, Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Celia Huber, María del Mar Martínez Márquez, Sara Prince, & Ashley Thomas, Diversity Matters Even More: The Case for Holistic Impact, McKinsey & Company (Dec. 5, 2023) https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/diversity-matters-even-more-the-case-for-holistic-impact#/ (last viewed Jan. 4, 2026) (reporting upward trends of the representation of women and ethnic diversity on executive teams from 2015 through 2023). ↩
  50. 50. See Forbes, supra note 49; Fraser, supra note 7. ↩
  51. 51. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title42/chapter21/subchapter6&edition=prelim [https://perma.cc/5DS9-VUCJ] (summarizing amendments). ↩
  52. 52. Notably, Congress knows how to codify affirmative action if it wishes. See, e.g., Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C § 4212 (requiring federal contractors to take affirmative action to hire and promote certain military veterans); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (requiring federal contractors to “take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities”). ↩
  53. 53. See Forbes, supra note 49; Fraser, supra note 7. ↩
  54. 54. Citigroup, Inc., supra note 10, at 14 (emphasis added). ↩
  55. 55. Id. at 14, 19; Citigroup, Inc., 2023 Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, 14 (April 25, 2023) (discussing progress on increasing Black executive membership as an example of “minorities”). ↩
  56. 56. Bank of America, supra note 10, at 42. ↩
  57. 57. Id. at 43. ↩
  58. 58. BlackRock, supra note 10, at 9, 70. ↩
  59. 59. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-330, 341, 343 (2003) (explaining “racial balancing, . . . is patently unconstitutional,” and holding using race as a narrowly tailored “‘plus’” factor in law school admissions to support the benefits of a diverse student body remained permissible). ↩
  60. 60. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181, 211-213, 230 (2023). ↩
  61. 61. Id. at 213. ↩
  62. 62. Exec. Order, supra note 1, at 8633. ↩
  63. 63. Id. ↩
  64. 64. Compare Exec. Order, supra note 1, at 8633, 8634, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (noting how both prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). ↩
  65. 65. Exec. Order, supra note 1, at 8633. ↩
  66. 66. Id. at 8633-36. ↩
  67. 67. Id. at 8633. ↩
  68. 68. Id. at 8633-35; see also EEOC, What You Should Know About DEI-related Discrimination at Work, What You Should Know, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-dei-related-discrimination-work (last viewed Jan. 10, 2026). ↩
  69. 69. Exec. Order, supra note 1, at 8635. ↩
  70. 70. EEOC, EEOC and Justice Department Warn Against Unlawful DEI-Related Discrimination, Newsroom, (Mar. 19, 2025) https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-and-justice-department-warn-against-unlawful-dei-related-discrimination [hereinafter EEOC Press Release] [https://perma.cc/UZ7M-E78Z] (explaining the information that the EEOC is releasing to help assist businesses navigate the intricacies of Title VII which references EEOC, supra note 68). ↩
  71. 71. EEOC, supra note 68 (FAQ no. 4). ↩
  72. 72. Id. (FAQ no. 9). ↩
  73. 73. Id. (FAQ no. 9). ↩
  74. 74. Samantha L. Brooks, Christopher J. DeGroff, James P. Nasiri, & Andrew L. Scroggins, Frozen Pipeline: Examining the EEOC’s Quietist Year in a Decade, Seyfarth Shaw (Sept. 30, 2025), https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/frozen-pipeline-examining-the-eeocs-quietest-year-in-a-decade.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2026). ↩
  75. 75. Id. ↩
  76. 76. Andrea Lucas (@andrealucasEEOC), X (Dec. 17, 2025, at 16:47 ET), https://x.com/andrealucasEEOC/status/2001439099907961012 ↩
  77. 77. Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 313 (2025) (“We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened [evidentiary] standard on majority-group plaintiffs.”). ↩
  78. 78. See Verlinden, supra note 5 (encouraging companies to adopt systemic DEIB efforts to maximize results). ↩
  79. 79. See Claire McCarty Kilian, Dawn Hukai, & C. Elizabeth McCarty, Building diversity in the pipeline to corporate leadership, 24 J. of Mgmt. Dev. 155, 163, 166 (2005) (discussing mentorship as an effective method of “developing and training talented minority and female employees” and that networking and mentoring help “level the playing field” among disadvantaged employees). ↩
  80. 80. See Jose Guadalupe Rivas & Esther Chihye Kim, Reflections of First-Generation Professionals: Impacts of First-Gen College Experience on First-Time Employment, 5 J. of First-Generation Student Success 105, 117-18 (2025) (qualitative study of first-generation college students reporting that challenges with finding a supportive professional network led to struggles with career success among such students). ↩
  81. 81. See, e.g., Bank of America, supra note 10, at 43 (explaining it strived for its “workforce to mirror the clients and communities” it served); Citigroup, Inc., supra note 10, at 18 (“Citi’s commitment to diversity, equity and inclusion continues to reflect a workforce that represents the clients it serves globally. . . .”). ↩
  82. 82. Exec. Order, supra note 1, at 8633. ↩
  83. 83. Id. ↩

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