The Selection of Judges in Michigan: The Constitutional Perspective

Under the Michigan Constitution of 1963, article VI, section 1, “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice,” consisting of “one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction,” called district courts. The Michigan Supreme Court has general superintending control over all the courts, the power to issue, hear and determine prerogative writs, and appellate jurisdiction in accordance with its own rules. It also has the responsibility to issue general rules controlling the practice and procedure in all courts of the state. Read More …

Selection System, Diversity And The Michigan Supreme Court

As Justice Elena Kagan takes her place on the U.S. Supreme Court, she becomes the third woman on the current Court, sitting alongside Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. Never before have three women sat on the Court at any one time. In fact, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was the sole woman on the Court for twelve years until Justice Ginsburg joined her. Then, after Justice O’Connor retired, Justice Ginsburg was the only woman on the bench for a few years until Justice Sotomayor joined the court. Thus, with Justice Kagan joining Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor on the Court, the first Monday in October 2010 will see the most women serving on the Court in its history. Read More …

Foreword

Threats to judicial independence arise when our judiciary becomes intertwined with the political process.

Judicial independence was of the greatest importance to the Framers of our Constitution. One of the main grievances the colonists listed against King George in the Declaration of Independence involved the absence of judicial independence in colonial America. The Declaration of Independence charged the king with “obstruct[ing] the Administration of Justice by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers [and making] Judges dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” To safeguard against those abuses, the Framers of our Constitution insured that it provides federal judges with tenure during good behavior, which means they can be impeached for serious misconduct, but not for their judicial decisions. The Constitution also ensures that federal judges receive a salary that cannot be diminished during their term of service. The history of the formation of our judiciary emphasizes a point that is often forgotten in the debate over how we select judges. The Framers of the Constitution saw fit to render our federal judges independent of the political departments so they would not be beholden to the political branches in their interpretation of the law and the rights of our citizens. The Founders knew that there has to be a place free from political pressure and popular opinion, a place where being right is more important than being popular or powerful, where fairness triumphs over strength. In order for judges to dispense law without prejudice, judges need the assurance they will not be subject to political retaliation for their judicial acts and decisions. Read More …

Changes from on High? The Possible Implication of Caperton and Citizens United for State Judicial Selection Reform

F. Andrew Hanssen offers a comprehensive hypothesis explaining why states have adopted different systems for selecting judges over time in his article Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in State Courts. In the article, Hanssen claims that new methods of judicial selection developed sequentially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (i.e. partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and merit selection) in order to protect state judges from being politically influenced by the other branches of government, and that each method gave way to the next when it was perceived to be ineffective at abating this influence. Hanssen also presents a hypothesis to explain why some states did not change their judicial selection methods in the period that he studied. According to Hanssen’s hypothesis, whether or not a state changed its judicial selection method was a function of the average size of its legislative majorities, when the state entered the federal union, and whether the adoption of a new selection system required a change in a state’s constitution. Hanssen also noted the crucial role that the legal profession played in lobbying for each successive wave of judicial selection reform through history. Read More …

Why Merit Selection of State Court Judges Lacks Merit

On Monday, May 14, 1787, the first delegates assigned to the task of revising the American federal system of government began to assemble in Philadelphia. Over the course of the following weeks, delegates from across the colonies arrived and took their seats in assembly. An intense debate ensued over whether, and how, to scrap the Articles of Confederation and replace them with a new guiding document. The delegates were divided over multiple issues, such as how to fund the federal government, what legal weight to give to treaties, and, notably, how to handle the question of slavery. Yet, however varied their views on the intricate details, the delegates ultimately determined that they were bound by one common principle: America should be a place where the people govern. Read More …

Public Confidence and Judicial Campaigns

In the spring of 2008, I was invited to participate in a panel discussion with Professor Charles Geyh on judicial selection. Professor Geyh had been a frequent and articulate critic of judicial elections, and I had been a skeptical supporter. But on the day of the discussion, we surprised each other. I had argued in favor of judicial elections based on principles of democracy—judges decide matters of policy based (at least in part) on the judges’ policy preferences, and therefore increasing public input into judicial selection makes those policy decisions more reflective of the public will. In my remarks that day, however, I acknowledged that different courts engaged in policy-making to different extents. As a result, I suggested that different methods of selection might be appropriate for different courts, so that the public would be able to exert some influence over the courts that make the most policy unconstrained by existing law, while other courts would be provided with greater independence. Read More …