Examining Citizens United’s Expansive Reach: Looking Through the Lens of Market Place of Ideas and Corporate Personhood

In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission the Supreme Court established that corporations and unions have the same political speech rights as individuals under the First Amendment. By rejecting the government’s compelling interest in prohibiting corporate electioneering communication, the Court ruled in favor of corporate use of treasury funds on indirect support of political candidates. This constitutional mandate of broadening corporate political speech rights beyond justifiable rational limits must be evaluated in full—a process still unfolding. The Court’s ruling proceeded along two predominant threads. In the first, the Court revived the corporate personhood doctrine in order to acquire a newer meaning of corporation replete with a broader assortment of rights than before. In the second, the Court granted a broader measure of political speech rights to corporations by invoking the First Amendment doctrine of the marketplace of ideas. While the opinion’s prudence has already been the subjectofmultipleinquiries, mycurrentanalysisfocusesontwodistinct areas. First, I examine whether the majority’s advancement of a corporate personhood doctrine is necessarily a prudent constitutional methodology for expanding corporate speech rights. Second, I shed revelatory light on the novel approach the Court has undertaken in embracing the marketplace of ideas doctrine for broadening the scope of corporate political speech. Posterity will indeed decide whether or not Citizens United was wrongly decided on both of these grounds. However, in its quest for corporate speech rights expansion, the Court might have engaged in incoherent jurisprudence. Therefore, this article examines the Citizens United Court’s trajectory along the First Amendment jurisprudence to its rationale for seeking a new corpus in American corporate law. Read More …

Changes from on High? The Possible Implication of Caperton and Citizens United for State Judicial Selection Reform

F. Andrew Hanssen offers a comprehensive hypothesis explaining why states have adopted different systems for selecting judges over time in his article Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in State Courts. In the article, Hanssen claims that new methods of judicial selection developed sequentially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (i.e. partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and merit selection) in order to protect state judges from being politically influenced by the other branches of government, and that each method gave way to the next when it was perceived to be ineffective at abating this influence. Hanssen also presents a hypothesis to explain why some states did not change their judicial selection methods in the period that he studied. According to Hanssen’s hypothesis, whether or not a state changed its judicial selection method was a function of the average size of its legislative majorities, when the state entered the federal union, and whether the adoption of a new selection system required a change in a state’s constitution. Hanssen also noted the crucial role that the legal profession played in lobbying for each successive wave of judicial selection reform through history. Read More …

Free Speech and Establishment Clause Rights at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: A Disclaimer: The Preceding Speech Was Government Censored and Does Not Represent the Views of the Valedictorian

It’s a quintessential American scene, repeated each spring in hundreds of cities and towns across the land. Brittany McComb appears behind a large microphone to give her valedictory address at the 2006 graduation exercises of Foothill High School in Henderson, Nevada. She is wearing a golden-colored graduation gown and mortar board, the bright tassel playfully dancing back and forth as she trips rapidly over her words and phrases. As it happens, Ms. McComb has more on her mind than the task of addressing her teachers, classmates, parents and friends in the cavernous hall. She had, as required, submitted her speech to the principal of the school, who was advised by legal counsel that the speech contained sectarian and proselytizing elements likely to provoke litigation based on the Establishment Clause. The principal advised Ms. McComb to remove these elements. At first she agreed, but she changed her mind and finally resolved to give her original speech. School administrators told her to cut her speech, or they would cut her microphone. Read More …