

THE TRUE 'DEFENSE' NEEDS OF OUR CITIES: CHICAGO MAYOR HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE REAGAN ERA WAR AGAINST DRUGS

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On Saturday, November 24, 1984, some 10,000 people waited for hours outside the national headquarters of Chicago's Operation PUSH to attend the funeral of 17-year-old Benjamin "Benji" Wilson, Jr.¹ Four days earlier, the Simeon Vocational High School senior had been shot twice with a .22-caliber pistol after an alleged robbery attempt just a block away from his South Side school.² At St. Bernard Hospital, physicians operated on him for five hours, but were unable to slow the internal bleeding caused by the severing of his aorta.³ By the time Wilson expired early the next day, Chicago police officers had arrested cousins William Moore and Omar Dixon, both 16-year-olds.⁴ Prosecutors charged the two Calumet High School students with murder and attempted armed robbery.⁵ "Statistically," noted one reporter, "the incident was nothing unusual; it merely underlined the distressing fact that young Black men have become their own worst enemies."⁶ Indeed, Wilson was one of 732 people murdered in Chicago that year alone.⁷ Of that total, eighty-seven were between the ages of thirteen and nineteen,

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1. See Salim Muwakkil, *Slaying of 'Benji' Wilson Accents Violence Epidemic*, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 12-18, 1984, at 8.

2. See *id.*

3. See *id.*

4. See *id.*

5. See Linnet Myers, *Teen Who Killed Ben Wilson Gets 40 Years in Prison*, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 23, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-11-23/news/8503210004_1_lighter-sentence-ben-wilson-william-moore.

6. See Muwakkil, *supra* note 1.

7. See William Recktenwald, *City Youth Slayings Up Sharply in 1984*, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 7, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-01-07/news/8501020224_1_gang-activity-gang-problem-killings.

already more than the previous year's total.⁸ But, as the nation's number one-ranked high school basketball player, and the scoring dynamo behind Simeon's 28-game win streak, Wilson was far from ordinary.⁹ Indeed, the significance of his high-profile murder was underscored not only by the long line of mourners stretched over several city blocks, but also by the attendance of various clergymen, civic leaders, and city officials, including the city's former Mayor Jane Byrne and recently elected Mayor Harold Washington.¹⁰

Wilson's tragic murder and Mayor Washington's presence at his funeral offer a window into the historical context that would shape the city hall's striking response to President Ronald Reagan's renewal of the war against drugs. The sense of crisis that followed the sudden overdose death of star college basketball player and number two NBA draft selection Len Bias in the summer of 1986 often is taken by scholars to mark a sharp intensification of this set of federal law enforcement efforts.¹¹ However, in Chicago, the death of a local basketball star, would prove more consequential, shaping the way in which this war would not only be dictated from above, but fought over and, for a period, challenged from below.¹² Speaking to a standing-room-only crowd of mourners, along with several thousand others listening via loudspeaker in an adjacent auditorium and outside on the street, Mayor Washington cast Wilson's tragic death as a warning to a city growing numb to the wanton killing of its Black and Latino children.¹³ "We have heard you, Ben," he remarked from the pulpit at Operation PUSH.¹⁴ "We must put an end to this gang violence, and senseless attacks that stalk Chicago like a man-eater in the night."¹⁵

As Washington's comments might suggest, the outcry over the city's gang threat in the wake of Wilson's murder now left the issue deeply intertwined with the politics of criminal justice.¹⁶ Just a day after Wilson's shooting, for instance, Alderman Richard F. Mell, a key

8. Toni Ginnetti, *86 Other Teens Have Killed This Year in Chicago*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 25, 1984, at 3.

9. See Mike Helfgot, *Simeon in the '80s: A Year by Year Breakdown*, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 14, 2013), <http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/highschool/ct-spt-0215-prep-bkb-simeon-history-i-year-by-year-20130215-story.html>.

10. See Muwakkil, *supra* note 1.

11. See Chuck Modiano, *How Len Bias' Death Was Used to Usher in Era of Mass Incarceration*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 24, 2016), <http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/basketball/len-bias-od-helped-usher-era-biased-mass-incarceration-article-1.2687187>.

12. See Muwakkil, *supra* note 1.

13. See *id.*

14. See *id.*

15. See *id.*

16. See *id.*

spokesman for a City Council's majority bloc that was openly hostile to Washington's efforts, declared that he would be proposing "Stop and Frisk" legislation as a solution to the problem of youth violence.¹⁷ The following day, aldermen aligned both with and against the Washington administration indicated that, in the wake of Wilson's death, they would now oppose the new mayor's proposal to scale back the size of the police department by 500 officers.¹⁸

By the afternoon of the funeral, a growing chorus of voices, particularly from within Black Chicago, demanded a solution to what was now seen as a growing problem of gang violence.¹⁹ Offering an alternative approach, leaders from some of the largest street organizations publicly sought to forge a ceasefire.²⁰ With the support of the Nation of Islam, they formed the Universal Communication Among Brothers (UCAB) in an attempt to head off potential gang conflicts.²¹ Facing various initiatives, Washington announced "that there [would] be no cuts in the number of patrolmen on the street[s]."²² Despite little evidence linking Wilson's murder to a neighborhood street conflict or gang affiliation, the Washington administration quickly sought to respond to what was now framed as a growing epidemic of gang-related youth violence during the midst of the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.²³ Thus, when Len Bias's death propelled the menace of illegal drugs into the national conversation a year and a half later,²⁴ Chicago already was in the throes of policing its own local crisis.²⁵

For his part, Washington revealed plans for a new program to combat the city's 110 identified gangs, estimated to have a total

17. See Harry Golden Jr., *Mell Calls for Stop and Frisk Laws*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 21, 1984, at 4. Mell's proposal ultimately became an ordinance to make the city's curfew laws stricter backed by the anti-administration faction of the City Council. *Id.*; see also Chinta Strausberg, *Anti-Gang Curfew Ordinance Fails*, CHI. DEFENDER, Nov. 29, 1984, at 3.

18. See Golden, *supra* note 17.

19. See Muwakkil, *supra* note 1.

20. See Henry Locke, *Gangs Say—'Let's End Crime Now!'* CHI. DEFENDER, Dec. 20, 1984, at 1.

21. See *id.* According to the *Final Call* newspaper's editor, Abdul Wali Muhammad, UCAB included the El Rukn Tribe, Black Gangster Disciples, Latin Kings, Vice Lords, Demon Gangsters, as well as the Moroccan Tribe, African Hebrew Israelites, and Nation of Islam. See Abdul Wali Muhammad, *A Key Step to Reducing Crime*, CHI. DEFENDER, Jan. 21, 1985, at 3.

22. Chinta Strausberg, *Gang Killers Stalk Cabrini*, CHI. DEFENDER, Nov. 26, 1984, at 1.

23. Charles Nicodemus, *A Final Farewell*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 25, 1984, at 3.

24. See Modiano, *supra* note 11.

25. See Muwakkil, *supra* note 1.

membership of 100,000 children and young adults.²⁶ Reshaped by the incarceration of key leaders a decade prior, these more tightly structured gang organizations were proving to be the source of shocking violence and well-organized criminal activity.²⁷ Ironically, though, these gangs initially posed a challenge to drug dealers seeking to introduce crack cocaine a highly addictive freebase form of cocaine, one that would persist years after its introduction in other major cities: “Crack came to Chicago amid the hysteria but really didn’t hit hard until the early 1990s.”²⁸ Whether it was out of community concern or a need to safeguard their control over the drug market, Chicago gangs like the El Rukns and the Black Gangster Disciples Nation (BGDN) initially resisted crack cocaine’s introduction by independent dealers and refused to sell it themselves.²⁹ As one police official noted: “we had info that some gangs in Chicago were resisting the importation of crack cocaine because of competition with heroin and marijuana.”³⁰ This crisis of gang violence, with all its idiosyncrasies, not only preceded the threat of drug addiction, but also, for a brief period, blunted its impact.³¹ For Washington, the difficulties inherent in crafting a response to this crisis would also be exacerbated by a municipal budget severely constrained by an openly hostile opposition that had a majority vote on the city council.³² These difficulties would profoundly shape how his administration responded to the Reagan era crackdown on drug use, reframing it as a fiscal conflict, with federal budget cuts depriving city officials of the resources needed to combat the threat of social problems like gang violence and drug addiction.³³

Through a local case study, this Article makes a case for the importance of the politics of place, alongside those of class and race, in the elaboration of the Reagan era War on Drugs. It will examine how the Washington administration sought to reframe the 1980’s drug war around a shift in urban policy that led to declining federal support for the country’s largest cities. Known as New Federalism, this policy change

26. See Chinta Strausberg, *Woodlawn Plan Augments City’s Anti-Gang Program*, CHI. DEFENDER, Jan. 14, 1985 at 3.

27. See Nathaniel Sheppard Jr. & William Recktenwald, *Gangs*, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8–12, 1984.

28. NATALIE Y. MOORE & LANCE WILLIAMS, *THE ALMIGHTY BLACK P STONE NATION: THE RISE, FALL, AND RESURGENCE OF AN AMERICAN GANG* 174 (2011).

29. *See id.*

30. *Id.*

31. *See id.*

32. See Anthony Cook, *The Ghosts of 1964: Race, Reagan, and the Neo-Conservative Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement*, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 81, 116 (2015).

33. *See id.*

effectively brought an end to large-scale federal assistance to the nation's cities.³⁴ In response, Washington and other local officials contended that decreased federal support for urban programs and municipal budgets amounted to a "war on cities," undercutting the very capacity of those on the domestic frontlines of the drug war.³⁵ Drawing on their experience responding to the crisis of street gangs, Mayor Washington and his aides sought to offer a robust response to the policy of New Federalism by providing vocal support for the omnibus legislation that would become the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.³⁶ "Now, as we focus on the war against drugs, one of the most urgent of our urban crises," explained Washington to an emergency meeting of mayors weeks before the new bill passed out of a congressional committee, "we must redouble our political efforts to steer Federal dollars to programs where we know they are most urgently needed."³⁷ In attempting to use the drug war's momentum to circumvent the President's budget-cutting program, the Washington administration's actions offer a bottom-up perspective on this pivotal moment in the war against drugs by highlighting the anti-urban biases of fiscal and legal reforms that would play a pivotal role in transforming the U.S. criminal justice system and ushering in an era of mass incarceration.³⁸

I. THE CRISIS OF GANGS

Prior to the 1983 electoral campaign that made him Chicago's first Black mayor, Harold Washington had been an astute opponent of the Reagan administration's new fiscal policy.³⁹ As a first-term representative, Washington arrived in the Capitol at the same time as the new president.⁴⁰ "Reagan's victory was a disaster for Washington's constituents but a boon to [Washington's] career," quickly establishing Washington as the bold and articulate opponent of the new

34. See Rena I. Steinzor, *Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?*, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 118 (1996).

35. See DAVID RANNEY, *GLOBAL DECISIONS, LOCAL COLLISIONS: URBAN LIFE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER* 120 (2003).

36. See Mayor Harold Washington, Statement for Mayors' Emergency Meeting on Narcotics (Aug. 26, 1986).

37. *Id.* at 2.

38. See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Globalisation and US Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to Post-Keynesian Militarism*, 183 RACE & CLASS 40, 171 (1998-99), <http://cult320.onmason.com/files/2012/08/Gilmore-199899.pdf>.

39. See Jack Houston, *Reagan Hit Over Underclass*, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 1986), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-04-19/news/8601280548_1_underclass-james-d-squires-mayor.

40. See U.S. House of Representatives, *Harold Washington*, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES.

administration's proposed New Federalism.⁴¹ Within the first months of his presidency, Reagan had articulated a goal of cutting taxes, limiting spending, and limiting the scope of "big government" by reducing federal assistance to cities.⁴² In instances where there was no reduction, the former California governor pledged to delegate key responsibilities, particularly in regards to social and economic assistance, to state governments.⁴³ "It is my intention . . . to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or the people," Reagan argued in his inaugural address.⁴⁴ "All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal Government."⁴⁵ In contrast to his predecessor's budget for 1982, the new President proposed roughly \$44 billion in spending cuts, much of it targeting urban programs.⁴⁶ For those programs remaining, Reagan's budget called for the consolidation of dozens of categorical grant programs into block grants to state and local governments, removing key guidelines that stipulated how to spend federal funds.⁴⁷

Rather than remaining silent, Washington quickly established himself as a critic of Reagan's New Federalism.⁴⁸ In repeated interviews, the freshman representative called for the restoration of this funding, with a freeze in the production of nuclear weapons and a 20% cut in defense spending to meet the administration's spending goals.⁴⁹ Moreover, Washington took action by helping his constituents find ways to mitigate the impact of these changes.⁵⁰ Within a few short months, his district office had worked with community leaders to establish task forces mirroring the various funding categories of the new block grant program, including housing, education, and health care.⁵¹ On January 15, 1982, these task forces sponsored a one-day conference on the impact of

41. GARY RIVLIN, *FIRE ON THE PRAIRIE: CHICAGO'S HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE POLITICS OF RACE* 58 (1992).

42. See Steinzor, *supra* note 34, at 113, 118.

43. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at "Regulatory Reform" in the Eighties*, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 517, 526 (1990).

44. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981).

45. *Id.*

46. See Sheldon Danziger & Robert Haveman, *The Reagan Administration's Budget Cuts: Their Impact on the Poor*, 5 FOCUS 13, 14 (1981-82).

47. See Reagan's "New Federalism", 1 CQ RESEARCHER (Apr. 3, 1981).

48. See Houston, *supra* note 39.

49. See U.S. House of Representatives, *supra* note 40; see RIVLIN, *supra* note 41.

50. See RIVLIN, *supra* note 41.

51. See Letter from Harold Washington, member of Cong. for the First Dist. of Ill., U.S. House of Representatives, to Howard Saffold, Afro-American Police's League (Jan. 2, 1982) (on file with the Chicago History Museum).

Reagan's New Federalism on those in Washington's South Side district.⁵² This conference was designed to take note of the fact that the shift to block grants not only led to the termination of some programs, but also empowered city and state agencies to play a key role in determining how funds would be spent.⁵³ A series of workshops provided some 250 local residents and human service providers with an opportunity to gain information on how to influence this decision-making process.⁵⁴ "The goal of the [conference] workshops," Washington explained, "is to develop strategies for impacting the new system to insure [sic] that services are preserved and that the people have input into the funding process."⁵⁵ Even though these efforts could not prevent Reagan's budget cuts, they did help prepare local agencies to deliberately engage in this new funding process.⁵⁶ By devolving responsibility to the state level, this process involved dealing with those in the administration of James Thompson, Illinois' Republican Governor.⁵⁷ Over the next two years, Washington hoped to not only ensure that local services were preserved, but also to bring together service providers in a manner that might lay the foundation for future efforts to win back what New Federalism was quickly stripping away.⁵⁸

Representative Washington's decision to run in the 1983 Chicago mayoral election interrupted these plans, but this concern with Reagan's underfunding of city programs would remain an important aspect of his campaign.⁵⁹ In an early campaign speech, entitled "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs," Washington blamed the increasingly difficult circumstances faced by Chicago's unemployed on what he characterized as incumbent Mayor Jane Byrne's fiscal irresponsibility.⁶⁰ For the upstart Democratic candidate, these failings did not end with her poor management of city finances.⁶¹ "To make matters worse, Jane Byrne has embraced President Reagan and Reaganomics, and has refused to fight in Washington for Chicago's needs," announced Washington at a campaign press conference.⁶² "In Illinois, Chicago has suffered devastating revenue

52. *See id.*

53. *See id.*

54. *See id.*

55. *Id.*

56. *See id.*

57. *See id.*

58. *See id.*

59. *See* Harold Washington, "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs," Chicago Mayoral Campaign (Jan. 17, 1983) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

60. *See id.*

61. *See id.*

62. *Id.*

losses because of Jane Byrne's inability to deal effectively with Governor Thompson and her unwillingness to fight for Chicago in Springfield."⁶³ For Washington, Byrne had erred in failing to offer a robust challenge to New Federalism, a set of policies that called for a mayor who would champion the needs of cities like Chicago.⁶⁴

A week later, Washington would press the issue further.⁶⁵ On the same night that President Reagan gave his annual State of the Union address, Washington announced his introduction of a comprehensive jobs bill that guaranteed minimum wage employment helping to rebuild and maintain public facilities and infrastructure for anyone out of work longer than a month.⁶⁶ The roughly \$9 billion cost of this program would be met by taking 5% of the appropriations for the Department of Defense.⁶⁷ For Washington, this approach reflected the need to push the federal government to provide a solution to the unemployment crisis in the nation's largest cities, the sort of assertiveness that incumbent mayor Jane Byrne had failed to demonstrate.⁶⁸ Washington remarked:

[Mayor] Jane Byrne has embraced Reaganism but she can't get the money for the city. . . . When I am elected Mayor, I will dedicate myself to turning the tide of Reaganism. I will dedicate myself to fight in Washington to reduce the bloated military budget that is debilitating this country; so that the money that is already appropriated can be returned to our cities. One of my first acts will be to form a coalition of the mayors of our great cities to carry the banner of our cities to Washington and demand passage of the jobs, education and rebuilding program that I will introduce tomorrow.⁶⁹

Three days before the primary election, Representative Washington reiterated the need for a jobs program.⁷⁰ However, in this instance, it was in the context of a proposal to thwart the criminal activities of Chicago's youth gangs, with recreation and job training as a means of protecting children from gang influence and offering alternatives to those already

63. *Id.*

64. *See id.*

65. *See* Harold Washington, "Welcome to Chicago," Chicago Mayoral Campaign (Jan. 25, 1983).

66. *See id.*

67. *See id.*

68. *See id.*

69. *Id.*

70. *See* Harold Washington, "23 points on the Police Department," Chicago Mayoral Campaign (Feb. 19, 1983).

gang-involved.⁷¹ This proposal was one part of Washington's comprehensive statement on crime, titled "23 points on the Police Department."⁷² Washington's speech directly linked growing fears around crime to a lack of public confidence in the city's police.⁷³ Pushing past the facade of the city's famous skyline, Washington remarked, "the real Chicago is a city crippled and divided by crime. The real Chicago is a city in which our citizens do not feel safe to walk the streets at night."⁷⁴ Foremost in his description of the fear of crime was the problem of gang-related violence.⁷⁵ As a matter of policy, his statement noted the importance of dissuading young people from joining gangs, but also promoted targeting those involved in criminal activities.⁷⁶ Washington's focus on gang activity was, to a degree, in response to a significant increase in gang-related killings.⁷⁷ The 1970s had been marked by a relative decline in gang activity, with police figures recording 197 gang-related killings from 1972 to 1978.⁷⁸ However, the following years would reflect a sharp increase in street violence, with more than 365 gang-related killings from 1979 to 1983.⁷⁹ By the end of 1983, police figures recorded more than seventy-five gang-related homicides, accounting for 11% of the city's 725 homicides, a 41% increase over those recorded in the previous year, and the highest in the city's history.⁸⁰

Yet, these statistics obscured the different ways in which gang activity manifested itself across the city: "[Black street organizations] had become institutionalized to such an extent that turf-related violence was not the major problem."⁸¹ In contrast, much of the city's turf-related violence traditionally associated with street gangs was concentrated in largely Latino neighborhoods.⁸² A combination of neighborhood

71. *See id.*

72. *Id.*

73. *See id.*

74. *Id.*

75. *See id.*

76. *See id.*

77. *See* USENI EUGENE PERKINS, EXPLOSION OF CHICAGO'S BLACK STREET GANGS – 1900 TO PRESENT 38 (1987).

78. *Id.*

79. *Id.*

80. Sheppard & Recktenwald, *supra* note 27. In contrast, only twenty-four gang murders were recorded in 1978, just 3.1% of the city's homicides. *Id.* In addition to homicides, police also recorded a rise in gang-related assaults, robberies, and other crimes. *Id.*

81. Judith Walker, *Reforming the Role of Human Services in City Government*, in HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE NEIGHBORHOODS: PROGRESSIVE CITY GOVERNMENT IN CHICAGO, 1983–1987 162 (Pierre Clavel & Wim Wiewel ed., 1991).

82. *See id.*

gentrification, generational conflict, and youth unemployment sparked violent confrontations on the city's West Side.⁸³ As such, the moral panic around gangs reflected an actually existing social problem as well as roiling class and generational anxieties about Black male youth during a moment of deep crisis.⁸⁴

During the 1980s, Black male youths faced a disproportionately greater likelihood of being subject to various societal ills, including being a victim of crime, childhood poverty, or structural unemployment.⁸⁵ The closing of Wisconsin Steel in 1980 marked a trend of deindustrialization that brought about a net loss of 150,000 manufacturing jobs in Chicago by the end of the decade.⁸⁶ Even as the country began to climb out of recession by the end of 1984, Black teenagers faced a 42% unemployment rate, the highest of any demographic.⁸⁷ As gang expert Earl Durham offered, "what we're seeing here is the result of two decades of neglect . . . We're witnessing the rise of an underclass that has no relationship whatsoever to the mainstream of American society."⁸⁸ For good reason, the fears of increasing youth violence within Black Chicago can best be thought of as a reflection of the sharply increasing structural violence brought about by the decline of the Keynesian mass production economy.⁸⁹

Yet, there were significant changes taking place both amongst and within Black street gangs that gave urban youth violence its own autonomous character. These changes reflected the organizational turn in gang culture, which transformed the "nation" gangs of the Black Power era into the street organizations of the Reagan era.⁹⁰ According to sociologist Sudhir Vankatesh, this transformation of street gang activity was:

[A]n outgrowth in the 1970s of the increasingly large population of incarcerated black youths. Prison officials, using gangs to help maintain social control, effectively enabled gangs and their

83. See *id.* By 1984, for instance, Humboldt Park, Logan Square, and West Town reportedly sustained the highest number of gang-related homicides in the country. Linnet Myers, *Gang Protest Meeting Draws 700*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1985, at A1.

84. See STUART HALL ET AL., *POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER* 17 (1978).

85. See Muwakkil, *supra* note 1, at 9.

86. See RANNEY, *supra* note 35, at 3.

87. See *Unemployment Rate*, CHI. DEFENDER, Jan. 17, 1985, at 21.

88. Muwakkil, *supra* note 1.

89. See Gilmore, *supra* note 38.

90. See ANDREW DIAMOND, *MEAN STREETS: CHICAGO YOUTH AND THE EVERYDAY STRUGGLE FOR EMPOWERMENT IN THE MULTIRACIAL CITY, 1908-1969* 282-83 (2009).

leaders to organize – often members joined simply for protection against indiscriminate physical harassment – and to consolidate, form alliances, and grow in number and strength. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, members returned to the ghetto streets and found few legitimate work opportunities but increasing opportunities to sell heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, and to join car-theft rings and extortion rackets.⁹¹

This expansion and transformation of gang activity was also reflected in the organizational restructuring of different nation gangs into more centralized, well-structured organizations.⁹² This organizational turn is best reflected in the development of the Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN) gang.⁹³ Following the 1974 death of David Barksdale, BGDN co-founder Larry Hoover personally took control of the gang from behind bars.⁹⁴ Hoover devised a detailed organizational plan naming himself Chairman of the Board.⁹⁵ As the undisputed leader, Hoover appointed the BGDN's Board of Directors, who set policy, amended nation laws, assisted with the education of members, and heard all complaints from within the organization.⁹⁶ In prison, this strict level of organizational structure, or bureaucracy, extended to each cell house, which had a Unit Coordinator and Unit Treasurer.⁹⁷ Those at the unit level reported to their Institutional Coordinator.⁹⁸ These coordinators

91. SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, *AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN GHETTO* 133 (2000).

92. See MOORE & WILLIAMS, *supra* note 28, at 130–36. The more exotic of these transformations occurred within the Black P. Stone Nation (BPSN), beginning with chief Jeff Fort's prison conversion to the version of Islam practiced by the Moorish Science Temple of America, a Black nationalist predecessor to the Nation of Islam. *Id.* In contrast to the Main 21, a broad coalition of gang chiefs empowered to set policy and resolve disputes for the BPSN, Fort positioned himself as the undisputed leader of a new, quasi-religious organization. *Id.* Upon his release from federal prison in March 1976, Fort transformed the BPSN into the El Rukns, an organization that not only professed a Muslim faith and a vision of community empowerment, but also a leaner, more well-disciplined, and more tightly structured street organization. *Id.*

93. See George W. Knox, *The Impact of the Federal Prosecution of the Gangster Disciples*, NAT'L GANG CRIME RES. CTR. (2008), <http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/page14.htm>.

94. See *id.*

95. See *id.*

96. See *id.* According to prison officials, Hoover appointed and then remained in daily communication with BGDN office holders in each prison, including a coordinator, board secretary, treasurer, legal coordinator, exercise coordinator, and educational program director. *Id.*

97. See *id.*

98. See *id.*

reported directly to the Board of Directors. This sophisticated, centralized bureaucracy made it possible for Hoover and his board to set the organization's guidelines through bylaws, but also update them through internal memos that became Gangster Disciple (GD) law and were studied as gang literature by all members.⁹⁹

By the early 1980s, this bureaucratic formalization of the GDs had crystallized under the banner of what Hoover termed the "New Concept."¹⁰⁰ This organizational philosophy cast the GDs as more than simply a criminal organization.¹⁰¹ Reflecting the influence of prior gang politicization efforts, internal memos referred to prison GDs as "Brothers of the Struggle,"¹⁰² and as members distributed this material outside of the prison, these memos referred to GDs on the street as "Young Black Brothers of the Struggle."¹⁰³ An October 1981 memo from the Chairman and Board of Directors¹⁰⁴ stated:

Laws and sentences have become more stiffer and longer [*sic*] and more prisons are being built with us in mind . . . We as an Organization of young Black Men cannot allow ourselves to stay confined behind walls and locked in cages to slowly grow old and useless. Through Business and Politics, we can build an economical base that will insure us boundless power and wealth. But if we stay uneducated and without political power, prisons and death will continue to be a way of life for many of us.¹⁰⁵

Another memo, dated July 14, 1982, sought to define the GDs as something altogether different than a gang by embracing a quasi-political agenda.¹⁰⁶ "A group of people organized around the idea of reaching common objectives is called an Organization. Without that Unit[y] that comes from having a common purpose, the same group of people qualifies as a Mob, Gang, etc."¹⁰⁷ Addressed to All Brothers of the Struggle, it continued, "[o]ne of the basic objectives of the Black

99. *See id.*

100. *Id.*

101. *See id.*

102. *Id.*

103. Interview with Elce Harris, Jr. (July 2013) (on file with author).

104. Knox, *supra* note 93.

105. *Id.*

106. *See id.*

107. *Id.*

Gangster Disciple Nation is: 'To obtain the means to Self-Determination for our People.'"¹⁰⁸

The New Concept sought to imbue the BGDN with a deeper sense of purpose and cohesiveness.¹⁰⁹ While the GDs under the New Concept remained involved in drug trafficking, extortion, and other illegal activity, they also sought to involve themselves in community empowerment.¹¹⁰ At their most ambitious moment, the GDs used their own front group, the Young Voters of Illinois, to participate in the historic 1982 voter registration drive.¹¹¹ "I don't know if you've recently heard the latest, but Our Organization stacked a Full House at the Voter's Registration Board," stated a September 1982 memo.¹¹² "Yes, our fellow brothers on the street are moving out. Our new concept that we have adapted (Preface) of Organization is not only being enforced here, but outside of these walls also."¹¹³ Similarly, the El Rukns, New Breeds, and Unknown Conservative Vice Lords each participated in the campaign that registered nearly 240,000 new voters, more than 160,000 of them Black, a surge of new voters that would help to propel Washington to victory in the Democratic primary and the general election.¹¹⁴

Although the impact of these voter registration efforts is unclear, they do reflect the degree to which this organizational turn further embedded gang organizations into some of the city's most marginal neighborhoods and the state's rural prisons. Thus, when the city officials sought to address the crisis of gang violence in 1985, they faced a daunting task. Moreover, they did so at a moment in which there were fewer vehicles through which local officials could directly address the sort of social and economic privations that gang organizations were becoming more adept at fulfilling.

In addition to decreased federal funding, Washington would also have to contend with stark challenges from fellow Democrats on the City Council. Despite becoming Chicago's first Black mayor and a rising star within his own party, Washington would face considerable opposition

108. *Id.* In addition to spelling out a new philosophy for the BGDN, this memo also listed the organization's sixteen rules against stealing, gambling, rape, using drugs, and assaulting prison guards, to be studied and memorized by all members. *See id.*

109. *See id.*

110. *See id.*

111. *See id.*

112. *Id.*

113. *Id.* It continued "our brothers have been involved in the cleaning of the 16th and 17th ward. And now they are involving themselves in a Voter-Registration-Drive." *Id.*

114. *See* Sheppard & Recktenwald, *supra* note 27; ABDUL ALKALIMAT & DOUG GILLS, HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE CRISIS OF BLACK POWER IN CHICAGO: MASS PROTEST 115 (1989).

from the City Council's majority bloc of machine aldermen who actively blocked his legislative agenda.¹¹⁵ Forced to rely on his office's executive powers, Washington and those in his administration still sought to respond to broader events in a way that allowed them to pursue their campaign commitment to addressing the funding inequities of Reagan's New Federalism.¹¹⁶

II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Framed largely as another gang-related killing, the murder of Benjy Wilson prompted the Washington administration to act.¹¹⁷ In early 1985, mayoral aide Michael Holewinski announced the creation of a Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention, a move that drew directly on Washington's prior effort to mitigate the worst effects of the new block grant program.¹¹⁸ The Task Force's thirty members were drawn from both the public and private sectors, and included representatives from some of the city's largest social welfare agencies and charitable organizations.¹¹⁹ With only one month to come up with a series of proposals, the Task Force held the first of twenty-five public meetings on January 9th at the Benito Juarez High School in the Pilsen neighborhood.¹²⁰ These hearings sought to respond to a crisis of public confidence by offering ample opportunity for local residents to be heard.¹²¹ At each hearing, Task Force members asked local residents to identify anti-gang priorities and propose possible solutions that best fit the needs of their particular neighborhood.¹²² The first hearing drew more than 350 people, who posed questions ranging from why nothing was being done to combat street organizations, and how the sister of a recently deceased gang member could get help raising money for his funeral.¹²³ The following day, Task Force members held another public

115. See Chinta Strausberg, *Anti-Gang Curfew Ordinance Fails*, CHI. DEFENDER, Nov. 29, 1984, at 3.

116. See RANNEY, *supra* note 35.

117. See Strausberg, *supra* note 115.

118. See Jim Quinian, *Task Force to Map Strategy on Gangs*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 7, 1985, at 6.

119. See *id.* Initially, the task force only had five members, but in response to the criticism of administration plans in the media and in city council, Holewinski expanded it significantly. See *id.*

120. See *id.*; Leslie Baldacci, *W. Siders Urge Ways to Thwart Gang Crime*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 11, 1985.

121. See Manuel Galvin, *City Invites Public Comment on Gangs*, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1985, at 3.

122. See *id.*

123. See *id.*

hearing at the Area Three headquarters that drew roughly 150 West Side residents.¹²⁴ There, nearly twenty-five people testified not only about their fears of gang violence, but also about efforts to provide youth at risk of gang recruitment with job opportunities, and about efforts to engage established street organizations in local crime-fighting efforts.¹²⁵

On the same day of the second hearing, Joanna Brown, Deputy Director of the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information, wrote a congratulatory memo to Holewinski, now task force chairman, regarding the news media's coverage of these initial hearings.¹²⁶ In the lead up to the first several hearings, both the *Sun-Times* and the *Tribune* had published a series of articles that offered a favorable description of the Task Force's work.¹²⁷ Despite some initial grumbling by many reporters that the community hearings were for show, Brown explained, "they come forth with straight-forward, respectful articles and TV coverage that take both us and the communities seriously."¹²⁸ Brown's comments reflected the heightened sensitivity of the Washington administration to negative media attention, particularly on issues of gang violence.¹²⁹ They also exposed a line of criticism that posited these community meetings not as part of a participatory policy-making process, but as more window dressing.¹³⁰

To some degree, however, the framework of the new violence prevention policy had already been set before scheduling these neighborhood hearings. Just one month prior to Brown's memo, mayoral aides and several gang crimes officers had met with Larry Rawls, Deputy Director of the Philadelphia-based Crisis Intervention Network, Inc.¹³¹

124. See Baldacci, *supra* note 120.

125. See *id.* The diversity of opinions expressed reflected the range of perspectives on what the problem of youth crime consisted of, as well as what the appropriate solution was. *Id.* In the wake of Benjy Wilson's tragic murder, calls for stricter laws and increased law enforcement ranged from anti-administration Aldermen Ed Burke and Dick Mell, to local activists Lu Palmer and Reverend Jesse Jackson. At the same time, Superintendent Rice reportedly served as the voice of caution within the Washington administration, as the police department had recently seen 800,000 to 1,000,000 disorderly conduct arrests voided in a ruling by U.S. District Court Judge Prentice Marshall. *Sneed & Lavin Inc.: Scones and Scrapes . . .* CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1984, at 30; Maurice Possley, *800,000 Arrests Voided: Primarily Minorities Involved*, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1984, at 1.

126. See Memorandum from Joanna Brown, Deputy Dir., Mayor's Office of Inquiry & Info., City of Chi., to Michael Holewinski, Mayoral Assistant (Jan. 10, 1985) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

127. See *id.*

128. *Id.*

129. See *id.*

130. See *id.*

131. Chinta Strausberg, *Philly May Be Model for Anti-Gang Plan*, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1985, at 1, 22.

Since its inception in 1975 as a community-based Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA)-funded violence prevention initiative, the Philadelphia program had spun off from the city to become a separate non-profit organization.¹³² Credited with substantially reducing gang crime, the program attributed its success to its efforts to maintain direct community involvement.¹³³ Its model employed a central office equipped to receive tips about conflicts that could potentially escalate to violence, a cadre of street workers to intervene in these conflicts, and a team of adult probation officers supervising individuals already enmeshed within the criminal justice system.¹³⁴ Rawls described this model as comprehensive and flexible enough to adapt to the characteristics of each target neighborhood.¹³⁵ During their meeting with city officials, program staff boasted about a sharp decline in gang-related deaths in Philadelphia, from an average of forty, to zero in the first eleven months of 1984.¹³⁶

This approach to gang violence had even been piloted in Chicago several years earlier to address the rise in gang violence in the greater Humboldt Park area.¹³⁷ In 1981 alone, police recorded at least eighty-four gang-related homicides.¹³⁸ That same year, organizers began a pilot project in the largely Puerto Rican neighborhood of Humboldt Park.¹³⁹ Staffed only by a program manager, two adult former gang members, and three social work graduate students, the project worked with local schools and neighborhood groups to intervene in potential conflicts—all on a budget of \$135,000.¹⁴⁰ Much of their efforts involved facilitating communication between the area's twenty major gang factions in order to prevent retaliatory violence.¹⁴¹ Although the project did not develop adequate local support, its adviser, Professor Irving Spergel of the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration,

132. *See id.*

133. *See id.*

134. *See id.*

135. *See id.*

136. *Id.* Unfortunately, city officials gave little indication of whether the success of this program might also have been due to the increased incarceration of gang members, just as it had been in Chicago during the 1970s. *Id.* Nevertheless, this outcome contrasted starkly with a reported sixty-three gang-related deaths in Chicago the same year, though the police department posted a 91% arrest record. Strausberg, *supra* note 17.

137. GORDON JOHNSON, STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, REPORT ON THE ILLINOIS SYMPOSIUM ON GANGS: FEBRUARY 28–MARCH 1, 1985 (1985).

138. *See id.*

139. *See id.*

140. *Id.* at 17–18.

141. *Id.* at 17.

concluded that it contributed to a marked reduction in violence.¹⁴² In comparison to previous years and similar neighborhoods, Humboldt Park experienced a drop in homicides, assaults, robberies, serious batteries, and instances of intimidation during the project's ten-month period.¹⁴³

The reported success of this intervention model in both Philadelphia and Humboldt Park largely framed the work of the Program Development Committee, one of four task force working groups.¹⁴⁴ Chaired by Vincent Bakeman, this group was charged with distilling the various comments made during community hearings down to the insights that would inform their proposal.¹⁴⁵ It took up a discussion of program design during their January 21st meeting, and the committee began by raising two viable options.¹⁴⁶ First, the model used by the Youth Welfare Commission of the 1960s was a citywide program like the Crisis Intervention Network.¹⁴⁷ The second option involved a process of simply funding various local programs.¹⁴⁸ At that moment, the committee's options were also constrained by the administration's last minute compromise on the 1985 budget with the City Council's majority bloc.¹⁴⁹ Their deal trimmed an initial allocation of \$4.5 million for an anti-gang program down to just \$1 million, and shifted oversight to a newly created Special Committee on Youth Development and Employment.¹⁵⁰ According to Michael Holewinski, the \$3.5 million cut was used to cover a \$20 million property tax reduction demanded by the majority bloc.¹⁵¹ Half of the requested \$4.5 million was reportedly supposed to have funded a youth employment program, touching directly on the issues of unemployment earlier identified by Washington, and another \$150,000 was to have been used to cover the costs of task force administration.¹⁵² For his part, Alderman Richard Mell, both a spokesman for the majority

142. *Id.*

143. *Id.*

144. *Id.* In addition to the Program Development Committee, there were also committees on Legislation, Resource Development, and Juvenile Justice. Letter from Michael Holewinski, Admin. Assistant to Mayor Washington, to Harold Washington, Mayor (Feb. 4, 1985) (on file with Chicago Public Library).

145. *Id.*

146. *Id.*

147. *Id.*

148. *Id.*

149. Hank Gratteau, *Gang Task-Force Chief Fears Council Bottleneck*, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1985, at A3.

150. *Id.* These cuts eliminated the proposed program and forced the administration to look to the Department of Human Services to shoulder the cost of task force administration. *Id.*; Harry Golden Jr., *City to Ask Public Help to Drive on Gangs*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 8, 1985, at 18.

151. Gratteau, *supra* note 149.

152. *Id.*

bloc and a Task Force committee member, recommended a request for proposal strategy.¹⁵³ Mell indicated that fellow aldermen would be more amenable to this process than a citywide mechanism to address youth violence.¹⁵⁴

By early February 1985, the last of the community hearings had been held.¹⁵⁵ The hearings had drawn more than 2,000 participants who offered Task Force members a variety of recommendations specific to different parts of the city.¹⁵⁶ At this time, Holewinski wrote to Mayor Washington explaining that the committee's leaders would propose that the Department of Human Services (DHS) launch a Division of Youth and Families charged with operating a "Community Intervention Program."¹⁵⁷ While inspired by the Philadelphia model, this program would favor channeling at-risk youth into various alternative activities over gang violence intervention.¹⁵⁸ At the same time, DHS would be able to provide grants to local organizations to strengthen their capacities in various areas, from youth development to victim assistance.¹⁵⁹ In a sense, this approach combined two of the proposals offered during the meeting that took place on January 21, 1985.¹⁶⁰ To help shape the priorities of these efforts and network the various youth programs into a more cohesive whole, DHS would organize an area advisory committee consisting of community leaders, youth advocates, and social service agency representatives in each of its nine service areas.¹⁶¹ According to Holewinski, Bakeman's committee already was in the process of forming these advisory committees by following up with organizations that had participated in the previous month's hearings.¹⁶² With the committee's support, this proposal would be refined before being brought to the mayor's desk. The Resource Development Committee would then seek out financial commitments from the Donors Forum of Chicago and other potential sources of funding.¹⁶³

At the same time, the Task Force's Legislation Committee evaluated dozens of bills that were pending in the Illinois legislature and offered its

153. Minutes of the Program Dev. Comm., Mayor's Task Force on Youth Crime Prevention (Jan. 21, 1985) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

154. *See id.*

155. Galvin, *supra* note 121.

156. Letter from Michael Holewinski, to Harold Washington, *supra* note 144.

157. *Id.*

158. *Id.*

159. *Id.*

160. *Id.*; Minutes of the Program Development Committee, *supra* note 153.

161. Letter from Michael Holewinski, to Harold Washington, *supra* note 144.

162. *Id.*

163. *Id.* at 3.

recommendation.¹⁶⁴ The committee proposed making the unauthorized discharge of a firearm within a city or a town a crime.¹⁶⁵ In addition, it sought to lengthen sentencing for those convicted of the illegal sale of weapons, the sale of weapons to youth, and the possession of weapons or narcotics on or within 1,000 feet of school property.¹⁶⁶ These measures would form the core of the package of Safe Schools Bills signed into law by Governor Thompson in 1985.¹⁶⁷ For its part, the Juvenile Justice Committee recommended expanding the Juvenile Courts Victims and Witness Assistance programs, focusing attention on truancy and other non-criminal juvenile misbehavior, and promoting better coordination between government agencies serving youth.¹⁶⁸

On March 6, 1985, Bakeman's committee drafted its Chicago Intervention Network (CIN) proposal.¹⁶⁹ Contrary to what its name might suggest, CIN did not focus specifically on violence intervention.¹⁷⁰ Grounding its program in the calls for both positive alternatives to gang involvement and a tougher stance on gang crimes, the committee's proposal prioritized community involvement, gang prevention, and law enforcement activities.¹⁷¹ "The CIN program is an ambitious proposal that pulls together, in a collaborative effort, all existing resources and programs which are targeted to youth development and youth crime prevention activities, so as to form a comprehensive net of services easily accessible to youth and their families," argued its authors.¹⁷² "Where there are gaps in services, the CIN program will work to fill these gaps by providing neighborhood-based programs with funding, staff, training, volunteers, or in-kind support."¹⁷³ According to this proposal, CIN would focus primarily on better coordinating and increasing the capacity of local neighborhood organizations, rather than having city agencies directly carry out these efforts.¹⁷⁴ While it adapted the twenty-four-hour hotline, the street intervention workers, and the resident advisory council

164. *Id.*

165. *See id.*

166. *Id.*

167. *See* CHI. INTERVENTION NETWORK, DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., CITY OF CHI., SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT 11 (Jan. 1986) (on file with Chicago Public Library) (hereinafter "SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT").

168. Letter from Michael Holewinski, to Harold Washington, *supra* note 144.

169. MAYOR'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH CRIME PREVENTION, CHICAGO INTERVENTION NETWORK PROPOSAL 4 (1985).

170. *See id.*

171. *See id.*

172. *Id.*

173. *Id.*

174. *See id.*

of the Philadelphia model, this proposal minimized the importance of directly intervening in potentially violent conflicts.¹⁷⁵

Over the next two weeks, CIN added a Coordinating Committee to its administrative structure, and expanded its agenda to address victim assistance and neighborhood watch activities.¹⁷⁶ Once introduced to the council, the CIN proposal would be held up in committee for nearly four months as pro- and anti-administration aldermen jockeyed for control of the program.¹⁷⁷ It would not be until early July that this program began operating under the direction of former Hispanic interests lobbyist Roberto Rivera with a \$1.9 million budget.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, CIN also began providing grants to community organizations out of its \$2.3 million in federal funds.¹⁷⁹ Despite this modest budget increase, CIN's primary objective remained that of many neighborhood organizations, diverting moderately involved youth away from gang activity.¹⁸⁰ "Though the CIN Coordinating Committee focused much of the program on prevention, there were others who urged intervention and mediation with the so-called hard-core gang members," DHS Commissioner Judith Walker later recalled.¹⁸¹ "There was often tension within the advisory structure as to what was the best approach."¹⁸² Within his first year Rivera was able to hire twenty-six Youth Intervention Workers.¹⁸³ While these intervention workers made up half of the program's staff, their approach to stopping gang violence differed markedly from the Philadelphia model.¹⁸⁴ In a November 1985 activity report, for instance, Director Rivera listed his staff's various accomplishments over the previous several weeks: a gang awareness presentation in the 46th ward; ninety-one interventions, twenty-nine of them gang-related; and two occasions in which the CIN team assisted those in need of emergency shelter.¹⁸⁵ Although thorough in their details, the apparent randomness of these accomplishments indicates CIN's lack of a larger anti-crime strategy. Indeed, it would not be until the following year before CIN

175. *See id.*

176. CHI. INTERVENTION NETWORK, *supra* note 167.

177. Clarence Page, *Street Gangs and Council Games*, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1985, at D3.

178. *See* Wes Smith, *Gangs-Program Director to Leave Post*, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1987, at A1.

179. *See id.*

180. *See id.*

181. Walker, *supra* note 81.

182. *Id.*; *see also* Smith, *supra* note 178.

183. CHI. INTERVENTION NETWORK, *supra* note 167.

184. *See id.*

185. *See* Memorandum from Roberto Rivera to Judith Walker (Nov. 8, 1985) (on file with Chicago Public Library).

would begin to develop a basic case management system, the absence of which prevented it from building the sort of bottom-up community involvement at the heart of the Philadelphia model.¹⁸⁶

Just as a lack of overall strategy marked the Washington administration's initial approach to gang violence, its approach to drug abuse would reflect much of the same.¹⁸⁷ Through the first several years of his administration, fighting the proliferation of illegal drugs had only begun to resonate broadly throughout his administration.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, these efforts were largely housed within the Chicago Police Department (CPD), falling under the broader anti-gang umbrella.¹⁸⁹ By early 1985, for example, the department began circulating its "The Trouble with Drugs" pamphlet.¹⁹⁰ Targeting young adults and their parents, it provided basic information about the dangers of illicit drug use and the legal penalties for drug trafficking.¹⁹¹ The danger of drug abuse also would fold into the city's "WE CARE" motivational and role model program. Launched months later, this collaboration between CPD and the Board of Education sought to expose groups of high school students to positive role models.¹⁹² Although conceived along with the CIN as part of the Mayor's Citywide Anti-Gang Control Program, the momentum of the war against drugs would soon overtake the program.

III. FIGHTING THE REAL FIGHT

On the morning of June 11, 1986, Mayor Washington convened a meeting of nearly two dozen officials in his city hall conference room.¹⁹³ These officials represented the various agencies involved in the administration's response to gang violence.¹⁹⁴ Six months earlier, these agencies seemed to have a significant impact on the streets, with the number of youth homicides dropping nearly 38% over the previous

186. CHI. INTERVENTION NETWORK, *supra* note 167, at 2–3.

187. See Memorandum from Irving Spergel, Professor, Univ. of Chi. Sch. of Soc. Serv. Admin., to Ben Kendrick, Chairman, Chi. Intervention Network Coordinating Comm. (Aug. 8, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

188. See City of Chicago, Statement Regarding Drug Reduction and Awareness Campaign 2 (Aug. 14, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

189. See City of Chicago, Gang Control Program 2–3 (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

190. See Pamphlet, "The Trouble with Drugs," Chi. Police Dep't (on file with author).

191. See *id.*

192. *Id.*

193. Memorandum from Alton Miller to Mike Holewinski et al. (June 10, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

194. *Id.*

year.¹⁹⁵ Police also had recovered 238 more guns off the streets than in 1984.¹⁹⁶ Although the number of gang-related homicides in and around the city's high-rise public housing developments hardly budged, the introduction of street intervention workers in the greater Humboldt Park area seemed to make a difference.¹⁹⁷ One year later, gang killings dropped from twenty-four in 1984 to six in greater Humboldt Park.¹⁹⁸ By that spring, however, police found that, while the number of gang-related homicides had not increased, the number of aggravated batteries was up nearly 65% across the city.¹⁹⁹ This represented a sharp spike in violent gang activity before the summer months had even arrived. "It seems to me that it is imperative that we inject some new energy into the anti-gang program," Holewinski explained to Washington in a memo proposing the June 11th meeting.²⁰⁰ Rather than ignoring these statistics, Holewinski suggested that Washington convene a summit to publicly assess the current status of the city's anti-gang efforts and correct any problems in its current strategy.²⁰¹

As the mayor's staff prepared for this meeting, they determined that it would be an opportune moment to announce an escalation in the city's efforts.²⁰² In addition to hiring an additional nineteen street intervention workers, CIN and the Police Community Relations teams would launch a campaign to assist neighborhoods in the establishment of anti-gang, anti-crime Block Clubs.²⁰³ These were described as an outward expansion of the work already done creating gang-free environments in some forty schools.²⁰⁴ Rounding out the morning's presentation would be updates from CPD and DHS on their summer youth initiatives.²⁰⁵ "These new steps will proceed along with the regular programs under the CIN banner which have already proved successful in fighting gang activity,"

195. Jean Davidson & William Recktenwald, *City Gang Killings Plunge*, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1985, at 1, 14.

196. *Id.*

197. *See id.*

198. *Id.*

199. Nicodemus, *supra* note 23.

200. Memorandum from Michael Holewinski, Admin. Assistant to the Mayor, on Gang Programs to Harold Washington, Mayor (May 28, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

201. *See id.*

202. *See generally* Anne Keegan & Jerry Thornton, *Chicago Losing Ground in War on Street Gangs*, CHI. TRIB., July 30, 1986, at 1.

203. *Id.*

204. *See* Synopsis of Chicago Intervention Network Block Club Plan (on file with the Chicago Public Library); Opening Statement of Michael Holewinski to Gang Crime Meeting (June 11, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

205. *See* Agenda, Gang Crime Meeting (June 11, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

Washington explained during the press conference that followed that morning's summit.²⁰⁶

As the summer progressed, however, the success of CIN was increasingly being called into question.²⁰⁷ Rather than remaining stable, the statistics for gang-related criminal activity continued to rise, not just in the high-risk areas targeted by CIN street intervention workers, but also throughout the city.²⁰⁸ When interviewing school principals, gang crimes officers, and victims of gang violence in the city's high risk areas, reporters found few that had seen intervention workers, even though intervention workers were required to attend police roll calls and engage with the families of victims.²⁰⁹ In August, Professor Spergel, an early consultant and a member of the program's central advisory board, publicly criticized CIN. "They've got to redo this entire program," he offered to a reporter. "They've got to target their goals, de-politicize the program and start working closely with the police because we've got a real problem here."²¹⁰ In a letter to the leadership of CIN and DHS, Spergel, argued that CIN had too many goals, poor information management, and structure and program strategies reflecting the interests of key youth development agencies funded by DHS.²¹¹ "On the other hand, there is insufficient participation in the CIN Coordinating Committee and insufficient planned program involvement by key agencies or community groups concerned with and active in dealing with the gang problem," wrote Spergel.²¹² "The available data indicate that CIN has had no impact on the gang problem in Chicago over its year of program operation."²¹³ Drawing on his reputation as a gang expert, Spergel suggested that what was needed was an independent agency focused specifically on gang violence reduction, operating in coordination with law enforcement, and developing a direct relationship with gang organizations in different communities.²¹⁴ In essence, CIN should either return to the model operating in cities like Philadelphia and Los Angeles, or be abandoned altogether.²¹⁵

206. Harold Washington, Mayor, Mayor's Statement at Press Conference (June 11, 1986) (transcript available in the Chicago Public Library).

207. See Keegan, *supra* note 202.

208. *Id.*

209. Keegan, *supra* note 202, at 1, 6.

210. Anne Keegan & Jerry Thornton, *Gang Plan Defend by Mayor*, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 1986, at A3.

211. Memorandum from Irving Spergel to Ben Kendrick, *supra* note 187, at 1.

212. *Id.* at 2.

213. *Id.* at 6.

214. *Id.* at 2.

215. *Id.*

What's more, this approach to fighting gang crime provided Washington with few opportunities to address the problem in the manner that he had envisioned during the campaign. Not only did CIN fail to get to the heart of the gang issue, but its approach to addressing gang activity as primarily a matter of intervention left little room for him to broaden its focus to larger questions of economic opportunity and federal funding. However, due to the growing concern about drug use, particularly surrounding crack cocaine, Washington would have a chance to seize just such an opportunity.²¹⁶ At the urging of Justice Department officials, President Reagan had announced his administration's war against drugs in October 1982, but through the early years of his administration, public concern about the issue remained at a low ebb.²¹⁷ As noted earlier, this changed dramatically in the spring of 1986, following the powder cocaine-related death of Len Bias.²¹⁸ Even though the college star had not been using crack, his story fueled an unprecedented "media epidemic" of news reports covering the issue.²¹⁹ Legal scholar Doris Marie Provine noted that "[i]n the three months before the 1986 election, there were one thousand stories discussing crack."²²⁰ Multiple "media outlets ran stories suggesting a pandemic of crack use. Public concern about drugs rose in tandem with media coverage."²²¹ Amidst this growing public concern, Washington and his aides closely watched Congress, with an eye to reshaping the emerging debate to the city's advantage.²²²

As federal officials scrambled to demonstrate their responsiveness to this seeming pandemic, the Washington administration also moved to position Chicago and other cities as the nation's best authorities on addressing the problem of drug abuse.²²³ A statement from City Hall noted that "Chicago City Government recognized the immensity of the problem of drug abuse years ago and has been actively involved on many fronts in combatting this problem."²²⁴ The statement went on to affirm "[w]e welcome everyone's support because what we are up against is

216. David A. Sklansky, *Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection*, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1995).

217. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, *UNEQUAL UNDER THE LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS* 103 (2007).

218. *Id.*

219. *Id.*

220. *Id.* at 106.

221. *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

222. See Washington, *supra* note 36.

223. *Id.*

224. City of Chicago, *supra* note 188.

both serious and complex.”²²⁵ In contrast to the anti-drug efforts announced by the White House and key Congressional leaders that cast drug abuse as a moral issue, Washington detailed a ten-point drug awareness campaign.²²⁶ Funded with \$300,000 from the city’s Community Development Block Grant, this effort emphasized prevention, treatment, and enforcement.²²⁷ Several of these points drew on past anti-gang efforts.²²⁸ For instance, Washington pledged the city would increase activities focused on youth, particularly with anti-drug curriculum targeting school-age children.²²⁹ As in past efforts, the message would be clear: “Stay in School; Stay Away from Drugs; Stay out of Gangs.”²³⁰

However, the most significant aspect of this ten-point campaign was its first point, promising that at the federal and state government levels, officials would take responsibility in ensuring that cities like Chicago are able to succeed.²³¹ “Without the commitment of Federal and state enforcement of narcotics trafficking and without a fair return on our tax dollars from federal and state governments our hands are tied,” explained the city’s statement.²³² It noted that an upcoming emergency summit of the bipartisan United States Conference of Mayors would provide an opportunity for Washington to join with his counterparts from around the country to ensure Reagan’s New Federalism did not continue to constrain their anti-drug efforts.²³³ “The results of this summit will be the development of an agenda for federal, state, and local action. Chicago is not alone in this crisis and we will work together with our sister cities to find a course of action for this serious problem.”²³⁴ Rather than simply pushing back on the national hysteria around drug abuse, Mayor Washington and his staff sought to engage it and redirect it towards policy solutions that would upend Reagan’s New Federalism by ensuring that local and state governments had the tax revenue they needed to carry the fight forward.²³⁵

By the time the city issued this statement, Washington and his aides had already identified at least one piece of legislation that exemplified

225. *Id.*

226. *See id.*

227. *Id.*

228. *Id.*

229. *Id.* at 6.

230. *Id.*

231. *Id.* at 3.

232. *Id.*

233. *Id.*

234. *Id.*

235. *Id.*

their approach. In January 1985, Representative Charles Rangel of New York had introduced the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act, which would authorize \$625 million a year over the following five years to those law enforcement agencies on the frontlines of fighting drug-related crime.²³⁶ By early August 1986, the proposed bill had already attracted 141 co-sponsors.²³⁷ As a former colleague of Washington from the mayor's brief tenure in the House of Representatives, Rangel was in agreement that increased local funding was both essential to an effective anti-drug effort and a matter of principle. "We must not lose sight of the fact," Charles Rangel wrote to a fellow congressman, "that the drug enforcement problems on the local level are the direct result of the failure of the Federal government to control the international production and smuggling of illegal drugs into our country."²³⁸ As chair of the Select Committee on Narcotics, Rangel was well positioned to craft the yet to be determined omnibus drug legislation. Drumming up support for Rangel's funding proposal would be a key aspect of Washington's efforts over the next several months.²³⁹

On August 26, 1986, Mayor Washington attended the Emergency Mayors' Summit on Narcotics and spoke during a morning session dedicated to legislative solutions to the ongoing drug crisis.²⁴⁰ In a draft of his prepared remarks, Washington planned to speak directly to the merits of Rangel's bill, currently still before the House Judiciary Committee.²⁴¹ Not only did other bills propose levels of funding that were too low, they also continued to rely on passing the money through the states, and added a matching funds requirement as well.²⁴² Competing bills underestimated the funds needed for drug treatment and restricted money from being spent on prison renovation or expansion.²⁴³ Similarly, educational funding was only for in-class curriculum, when those who really needed targeting for an anti-drug message would not be found in school.²⁴⁴ Ultimately, Washington hoped to rally his colleagues to join

236. See Letter from Representative Charles Rangel to Representative Peter Rodino, Jr. 1 (Aug. 12, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

237. *Id.*

238. *Id.* at 2.

239. *Id.*

240. See Annotated Outline of the Conference 1-2 (Aug. 26, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

241. See Washington, *supra* note 36.

242. See Discussion: Framework of Cities' Need for Federal Drug Control Assistance 2 (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

243. See *id.*

244. See *id.*

together to support Rangel's proposals as it moved toward a committee vote over the next few weeks.²⁴⁵

This direct advocacy for the Rangel bill would be left out of the final draft of his remarks, but Mayor Washington would frame much of his address around the need for increased federal funding.²⁴⁶ Rather than simply seizing the opportunity of the moment, he also appropriated the increasingly popular language of the President's anti-drug crusade being analogous to a war.²⁴⁷ "I'm here to tell you that we have one single mission here today," he began.²⁴⁸ "We have to pool our political resources and force the White House and Congress to increase defense spending where we need it the most, where we are most defenseless—in the cities' war against drugs."²⁴⁹ Drawing on themes that had been part of his critique of the Reagan administration since his days as a freshman Congressman, Washington encouraged his colleagues to reframe the anti-drug policy around the needs of the nation's large urban areas and take a lead role in crafting this policy.²⁵⁰ He argued that if the War on Drugs, he argued, was going to be discussed as a military conflict, then it stood to reason that city streets were its frontlines, armed with its "seasoned veterans," the public officials who helped keep their cities safe.²⁵¹ "Defense spending" was not only a matter of foreign conflicts, but also included the various municipal programs now threatened by policies that effectively drained cities of federal funding.²⁵²

He explained:

In the anti-city policies that date back to 1981, the Federal administration began to sow the wind. In our cities five years later, in 1986, we are reaping the whirlwind.

Mayors are involved in an uphill fight to prevent the Federal government from ending General Revenue Sharing, and a host of federal funds whose loss would further devastate our scarred cities.

Now, as we focus on the War against Drugs, one of the most urgent of our urban crises, we must redouble our political efforts

245. *Id.*

246. *See* Washington, *supra* note 36.

247. *See id.*

248. *Id.* at 1.

249. *Id.*

250. *See id.*

251. *Id.*

252. *Id.*

to steer Federal dollars to programs where we know they are most urgently needed.

America's eyes have been opened. Suddenly, from Air Force raids on Bolivian marijuana plantations, to a Coast Guard mini-fleet in New York Harbor, to little glass jars in the White House itself, there is a clamor for action, and a willingness to deal with drugs. I would suggest, without characterizing these other efforts, that we mayors might be able to come up with a few more productive ideas.

By working together with the White House and Congress, and by gathering our city forces together, we have an opportunity to make more than headlines. We have a rare chance for real change. The time is ripe, and we're ready to take advantage of it.²⁵³

For Washington, the drug war as an opportunity to fashion a coalition that could address an even broader problem: the challenges posed by what he cast as Reagan's "anti-city" policies.²⁵⁴

Yet Washington went further still. The drug war not only presented mayors from across the country with a chance to push back against the federal government's cuts to vital city services, but it also offered a chance for them to press home the war against gangs.²⁵⁵ Reflecting the influence of his administration's ongoing efforts to stem the influence of the city's gangs, Washington's address also cast the war against gangs as tightly linked to any anti-drug effort.²⁵⁶ In doing so, he identified his city's ongoing war against gangs as the foundation for its emerging anti-drug policy, as the overwhelming majority of gang organizations were involved in the business of drug dealing.²⁵⁷ Even if crack cocaine had not yet gained a foothold in Chicago, other illegal drugs still were a threat, and efforts to fight them simply through police enforcement were absorbing a greater share of the city's budget. "These costs illustrate how the cities are caught between a rock and a hard place - - our 'defense budget' is breaking our back - - yet the social costs of the drug culture is ruining the quality of our lives," explained Washington.²⁵⁸ "We have

253. *Id.* at 2.

254. *Id.*

255. *See id.*

256. *See id.*

257. *See id.*

258. *Id.* at 4.

learned anew that there must be a balanced approach - - an interrelationship of enforcement, prevention and treatment, all supported by community involvement. This integrated approach is not cheap. The funding level of the current Omnibus Anti-Drug Act is a travesty.”²⁵⁹ Inadequate funding meant city’s like Chicago would have to make a cruel tradeoff, focusing solely on matters of law enforcement, as opposed to the equally important matters of prevention and treatment. “In this, as in America’s other urban programs, we need our national priorities turned from the false Defense spending to the true ‘defense’ needs of our cities.”²⁶⁰ This approach to thinking about the problem of drugs as not simply a law enforcement issue, but one that required robust city services and, consequently, generous federal funding, is an approach that would shape the actions of Washington’s administration over the remainder of his first term and the beginning months of his second.

After returning from the summit, Washington would continue to pursue this approach at the local as well as the state and national levels of government. Just as he did with his administration’s anti-gang efforts, Washington delegated the day-to-day responsibilities to members of his staff, principally Susan Weed, the Executive Director of the city’s Health Systems Agency.²⁶¹ With the support of other key staff members, including Michael Holewinski, Weed convened an external advisory group as well as an inter-departmental coordinating committee.²⁶² In both instances, members primarily came not from law enforcement, but rather from health, education, and human resources.²⁶³ By early September, this group of key staff members, calling itself the Chicago Alliance Against Drugs, had begun meeting regularly, pulling together the city’s disparate efforts.²⁶⁴

One of the first tasks of the administration’s Internal Coordinating Committee involved pursuing Washington’s agenda on the state level. At the New York City summit, Washington pledged to reach out to other mayors in Illinois to update them on the latest legislative developments, develop a common policy platform, and present it to their governor.²⁶⁵ In September, Weed and other staff members prepared a “Dear Colleague” letter on the omnibus drug bill.²⁶⁶ On September 8th, Representative

259. *Id.*

260. *Id.*

261. Meeting Notes, Mayor Washington’s Anti-Drug Appeal Internal Coordinating Comm. (Aug. 28, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

262. *See id.*

263. *See id.*

264. *See id.*

265. *See id.*

266. *Id.*

James Claude Wright introduced H.R. 5484 to the House.²⁶⁷ Attracting over 260 proposed amendments, it included less funding than Rangel's bill had initially proposed.²⁶⁸ Sent out to roughly 170 local officials, Washington's alert provided other mayors with an overview of the current legislative landscape, and continued to urge them to push their representative to support Rangel's bill.²⁶⁹ He also ensured that these officials were made aware that the current lawmaking went alongside a host of local initiatives, like setting up an informational hotline, drug testing city employees, conducting neighborhood outreach, and organizing public relations.²⁷⁰

This committee would also work with Washington to prepare for the Illinois Municipal League meeting, scheduled for late September.²⁷¹ There, Washington planned to update those in attendance.²⁷² Ultimately, Washington hoped to convene a meeting of the state's mayors the following month.²⁷³ Framed around Washington's key points of enforcement, prevention, and treatment, this conference was to serve as the basis for crafting an Illinois cities agenda to present to the Governor and the General Assembly.²⁷⁴ Just as Washington believed that cities, rather than the states should be at the forefront of decision-making and resource-allocation in a renewed war against drugs, so too did he believe that the cities themselves had to join together to put forward a common agenda at both the federal and state levels of government.²⁷⁵ The following month, city officials hosted the first ever Illinois Leadership Conference on Drug Abuse, with more than 100 mayors, state legislators, police, and educational officials meeting to craft a set of resolutions that Chicago's coordinating committee would take responsibility for bringing to state leaders in Springfield, Illinois.²⁷⁶

Lastly, but perhaps most consequently, this coordinating committee worked with Washington to take up a key proposal put forward at the

267. See Provine, *supra* note 217, at 111.

268. See *id.*

269. *Id.*

270. Agenda, Mayor Washington's Anti-Drug Appeal Internal Coordinating Comm. (Sept. 9, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

271. Meeting Notes, Mayor Washington's Anti-Drug Appeal Internal Coordinating Comm. (Sept. 9, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

272. *Id.*

273. *Id.*

274. *Id.*

275. *Id.*

276. Letter from Mayor Harold Washington to Ralph Elliot, Office of Congresswoman Cardiss Collins (Nov. 8, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

New York City summit: a national day of anti-drug events.²⁷⁷ Identifying November 18th as the Mayors' D-Day in the War Against Illegal Drugs, this concept was designed to raise awareness around local efforts to combat drug abuse.²⁷⁸ Repurposing the history of the 1944 landing of Allied forces on the beaches of Normandy, these events would be a chance to spotlight the efforts of mayors and other local officials to reclaim the momentum, attract media attention, and inspire broader civic commitment to a rejection of illegal drugs.²⁷⁹ Central to what would become the Chicago plan was the eliciting of audience participation through pledges of volunteer time, monetary donations, or a commitment to live a drug-free life.²⁸⁰

All told, officials in 349 cities in 49 states hosted similar events on the same day.²⁸¹ In Chicago, Weed and her colleagues ended up planning a series of events geared towards the city's school age population.²⁸² These events included an address to students at a north side high school, a press conference with writers and editors from several local college and high school newspapers, and a luncheon with roughly 500 community leaders pledging to abstain from drugs.²⁸³ Rangel stated "I believe this initiative by the mayors is a significant step toward arousing the community support which is so vital to the success of the war against drugs," in a letter circulated a month prior to the D-Day events. "It goes hand in hand with the Congress' anti-drug efforts and the legislation that we in the House have just passed."²⁸⁴ Indeed, while advocating for changes in federal law and revenue sharing remained important, they would become less of a priority as Congress had approved and Reagan had already signed Representative Wright's bill by the time mayors held their nationwide events.²⁸⁵ Thus, the focus ultimately became one of demonstrating that there remained a constituency actively opposed to drug use and using the attendant media attention to change what was perceived as the public's tacit acceptance of drug abuse.²⁸⁶

277. News Release, Mayor Washington Declares Nov. 18, 1986 D-Day in War Against Illegal Drugs (Nov. 6, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

278. *See id.*

279. Memorandum from Susan Weed, Executive Director, City of Chicago Health Systems Agency, to Kari Moe (Oct. 8, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

280. *See id.*

281. *See* News Release, *supra* note 278.

282. *Id.*

283. *Id.*

284. Letter from Representative Charles Rangel to colleague (Oct. 17, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

285. *See* PROVINCE, *supra* note 219.

286. Memorandum from Susan Weed to Kari Moe, *supra* note 280.

Three weeks after the Mayor's D-Day, Susan Weed circulated a memo to other members of the inter-departmental coordinating committee.²⁸⁷ By this time, the funds redirected from the Community Development Block Grants had been spent, and the fiscal constraints of the ongoing council wars had once again limited the options seemingly available to officials.²⁸⁸ Weed stated that "[t]he major question is how much effort we continue to put in it, and how visible we want to keep it," while listing nearly a dozen events, each of them designed to cost as little as possible.²⁸⁹ "There is not much else we can do without additional resources, and I think people understand that situation as we wait for the federal money to filter down to us."²⁹⁰ While additional research needs to be done to determine precisely the amount of federal funds city officials received and when they arrived, it is clear that fiscal constraints continued to hamper their efforts.²⁹¹ However, much like Spergel's earlier criticism of CIN, the administration's anti-drug efforts also suffered from having too many and overly vague goals, poor information management, and opaque program strategies. While it is possible that Washington, having won re-election and a majority of supporters on the City Council in early 1987, might have considered proposals to reform CIN, expanded his anti-drug initiatives, and pushed for adequate federal funding, he did not have the opportunity to move these items forward as he passed away from a sudden heart attack on November 25, 1987.²⁹²

IV. CONCLUSION

Having run his mayoral election as an insurgent challenger within the Democratic Party, Harold Washington articulated his vision of governance as being one in which the citizens of Chicago received their fair share. For many of his constituents, this slogan was understood to mean a progressive redistribution of revenue and resources to the city's working class, particularly its Black and Latino residents. During his 1983 campaign, Washington announced that "[t]he people of Chicago who have been neglected by the political bosses have announced their

287. See Memorandum from Susan Weed, Exec. Dir., City of Chi. Health Sys. Agency, to Kari Moe (Dec. 4, 1986) (on file with the Chicago Public Library).

288. See *id.*

289. *Id.*

290. *Id.*

291. See *id.*

292. Dirk Johnson, *Chicago's Mayor Washington Dies After a Heart Attack in His Office*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1987), <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/26/obituaries/chicago-s-mayor-washington-dies-after-a-heart-attack-in-his-office.html>.

willingness to become involved, to unify and act.”²⁹³ He went on to state “[i]f I am to be mayor, it would be as the spokesperson of this new movement. . . . Fairness will be our standard.”²⁹⁴ Washington’s opponents both on the City Council and in the White House would hamper this vision of a fair share. In Chicago and cities throughout the country, the policies of the Reagan administration would severely hamper the degree to which local officials could respond to a variety of urban crises, ranging from gang violence to drug addiction.

These constraints would play an important role in inducing Washington, one of the nation’s most progressive local officials, to vocally support the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, a law which marks a pivotal moment in the escalation of the war against drugs.²⁹⁵ An experienced and able politician, Washington seized upon the law as an opportunity to secure funding for Chicago and other cities that had been lost under Reagan’s New Federalism.²⁹⁶ Rather than relying on a response to illegal drug use that solely relied on law enforcement or appeals to morality, Washington emphasized the need for a balanced approach that included resources for prevention and treatment.²⁹⁷ Although he did so without articulating any public concerns for the Bill’s punitive treatment of drug addicts and criminal defendants, his uncritical embrace of the Bill’s use of mandatory minimums and the expansion of prison construction has to be balanced against his energetic effort to strike at the profoundly anti-urban biases of the Reagan era war against drugs. Despite their failure, Washington’s efforts help to place the impact of this federal policy program in a broader context. The process of denying city governments much needed tax revenue would compound the consequences of the war against drugs, as federal policies pushed municipalities to become increasingly reliant on policing as the sole response to illegal drug use, and left them without the resources to pursue a range of more public health-oriented solutions.²⁹⁸

While it deserves to be recognized for its uphill endeavors, the substance of these efforts of the Washington administration also deserve scrutiny. On the issues of both gangs and drugs, city officials seemed fixated on the management of crises, rather than the resolution of the more fundamental problems they reflected. In both instances, these efforts did not adequately aim at a solution to the problem. Rather than

293. See RANNEY, *supra* note 35, at 105.

294. *Id.*

295. *Id.*

296. *Id.*

297. *Id.*

298. Nuisance Industry, *Remembering Harold Washington*, DAILY KOS (Nov. 25, 2007, 9:14 AM), <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/11/25/413261/->.

developing a program whose model had a track record of success, it struck a deal in the design of the Chicago Intervention Network (CIN), effectively cobbling together a hybrid organization.²⁹⁹ Once the program launched, CIN's focus continued to stray away from gang violence and street intervention, to issues of gang prevention and youth development. Similarly, the city's inter-departmental committee effectively catalogued the various anti-drug activities being carried out by city officials, but did little in the way of bringing these efforts together to make them greater than the sum of their parts. The committee's most focused initiative, the pledge campaign, not only failed to have much durability, but also relied on a voluntary and media oriented approach to the problem, rather than one striking at the deeper problems of poverty, unemployment, and social alienation that Washington himself had identified on the campaign trial.³⁰⁰

299. Hanke Gratteau & William Recktenwald, *Mayor Aims More Cash at Fighting Against Gangs*, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 8, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-03-08/news/8501130386_1_chicago-street-gangs-gang-leaders-gang-crime.

300. See Washington, *supra* note 59.